# K --- Disability --- K Lab

## 1NC

### 1NC --- Shell

#### Ableist rhetoric feeds the project of the war machine as we march towards the horizon of a new Able-bodied world order. Rejecting attempts at “rehabilitation” is key to understanding debility as inherent to all bodies and deconstructing the project of the war machine.

**Heathcote 18 –** (Gina Heathcote is a feminist scholar working in the Centre for Gender Studies and the School of Law at SOAS, University of London, as well as a member at the Centre for Human Rights Law; War’s Perpetuity: Gina Heathcote (2018) War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality, Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44:1, 71-91,; Published online: 01 Aug 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1470447>) Dōgen

“[B]etween fixing and forgetting … [s]uccessful rehabilitation permitted the ‘formerly’ disabled body to be reintegrated into the nation’s significant social structures, such as work and family. Made ‘ordinary’ again, ‘identical’ to ‘normal’ citizens, the disabled would ‘disappear’”. 57 Jennifer James’ account of the relationship between the disabled body, black bodies in the US, and soldier/citizenship draws out the complicated structural history of soldier/citizens in the US. She argues for recognition of the history of blackness in the US to be understood as ‘synonymous with disability’ as ‘black men have envisaged military participation as an avenue toward liberation and citizenship, heeding the call for “able-bodied” men needed to fill military ranks’. 58 Through an analysis of the literary texts of Gwendolyn Brooks, James argues for the need for representation, rather than repression, of the injured and maimed black body returned from war. As such, James demonstrates the relationship between legal subjectivity, citizenship, and soldiering in the US. In arguing that military service might ‘undo’ the othering of the black male body in the US, James in effect acknowledges the white, masculine subject of law who need not act to gain full subjectivity. However, James also challenges the accuracy of ‘“ableists’” representations’ for ‘the act of representation, no matter how “authentic,” aids in this estrangement precisely because the disabled are mediated’. 59 The military mindset to repair and restore the returned soldier through assistive technologies likewise reproduces the expectation that the maimed body is not quite a full subject and that the restoring of the body is necessary to be a full citizen. This approach, argues James, ignores the constructed nature of the debility produced through warfare and thus reifies the notion that the body must always be restored from debility. Drawing on the work of Henri-Jacques Stiker,60 James writes: This cosmetic fix allows the inequalities created by political, social and ideological practices that relegate certain bodies to economic, gender, sex and physical (racial) alterity to conveniently recede from view … through ‘naturalizing’ socially produced disability, naming all difference ‘disability’ and claiming all ‘disabled’ capable of ‘rehabilitation,’ preventative measures are judged unnecessary.61 James’ argument recognises not only the socially constructed nature of disability resultant from armed conflict, but also the social construction of ‘the poor to the unemployed’ as Other and in need of rehabilitative interventions by the state, rather than recognition of any need to transform structural inequalities. However, James’ approach also highlights the ‘socially constructed’ nature of disability which, I argue, might have two meanings.62 First, as James writes, drawing on Stiker, a host of differences become marked as ‘disabled’ in a manner that requires individual interventions over structural change. Second, thinking through the disabled body returning from combat, the body is twice constructed as damaged, initially through the risk contained in a political decision to send armed forces to combat situations which is, in essence, a constructed risk and then through the need to ‘restore’ the body of the soldier, rather than care or accept differences associated with disability. For individuals who are thus framed as disabled, whether as the consequence of political decisions, political apathy, or from chronic, genetic, or other medical conditions, the focus remains on the rehabilitation to become ablebodied rather than a recognition that all bodies carry debilities, risk debility, and are debilitated. Likewise, there is a failure to see how compulsory ablebodiedness is attributed to the imagined subject of law. The shift to honouring, accepting, and seeing debility as integral to subjectivity thus frames subjectivity differently and, potentially, accepts the interface of technology with any body as an aspect of subjectivity just as the entwined relationships with humanness and matter, environment and nonhuman animals have the potential to radically alter legal constructions and engagements with subjectivity. James goes on to remind us that the dismembered female form has a long history in Western iconography from the Venus de Milo to the cropped female body of contemporary Hollywood films: if women are reduced to ‘parts’, black women are split even further as they are asked to pry the signs of blackness from their bodies and as blackness is ripped from their bodies and reshaped into a myriad of cultural signifiers.63 The maimed body of war must therefore be restored in a way that female and black bodies can never be restored/completed, reinscribing white masculine histories into the project of assistive military technologies for returned soldiers. For Yasmin Gunaratnam, ‘[r]ace and gender, in other words, complicate the cultural presence of disability’. 64 Thinking forward, through these re-readings of the material and discursive effects of subject formation, borne through the experience of citizenship and its various dislocations, and invisibly carried through legal categorisation, demands new modes of understanding and representing subjectivity. An alternative framing of subjectivity might thus begin with the notion of debility and the body, acknowledging thus the interrelated othering of racial and gendered others in the construction of legal subjectivity endured by modern man. Debility thus frames the future interface with technology as not rehabilitative, or restorative, but rather akin to the already-interface between technology and humans: a process that has a history as old as human invention. The technology of fire, for example, fundamentally altered human existence, changed her needs, patterns, and consumptions. Moreover, the contemporary use of technology has starkly changed the understanding of humanness, how humans live, interact, survive. At the same time both technology and humans impact on the livelihoods of nonhuman animals and of earth. To shift toward the notion of intertwined existence – or subjectivities – the exoskeleton has inspired me to see the human body as body-never-whole-never-complete and as ordinary in its dependencies on others, including nonhuman animals, matter, and technologies. Thus, drawing on Donna Reeves, it is necessary to recognise: For people with impairments, the hybridisation of machine/human or animal/human is often synonymous with lived experience, particularly for those with physical or sensory impairments … Potential cyborg figures can be seen in the wheelchair user, the person with a cochlear implant, artificial leg or pacemaker, someone who uses an assistance dog.65 While Reeve acknowledges the differential cultural readings of different technologies, their gendered meanings, the economic privileges required for access, the dependencies, and the increased means of medical surveillance technologies invoked must also be heeded. Reeve argues, ‘[r]ather than seeing technology as “fixing” impaired people in normative ways (and therefore to be rejected), it is more productive to see the new ways of being in the world that emerge from living as cyborg’. 66 Thus, to see the debilitated body67 as motif for reimagining subjectivity requires recognition of the ways the conceptualisation of modernist man has always rendered the non-male, non-heterosexual/heteronormative body as not only othered but debilitated. Feminist theorising on subjectivity and feminist legal projects might thus take the othered body as the conceptual lens to engage the nonhuman, matter, and technology. Viva la Frida!

#### The impact is techno caste system ordering those who have modified their bodies and those who have not

Fahn 20 (Chia Wei Fahn is an Assistant Professor in the Masters of Occupational Therapy Program, Perfecting Bodies: Who Are the Disabled in Andrew Niccol’s Gattaca?, <https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/5/2/6>, 4/1/20)

The social model of disability identifies systemic barriers and social exclusion as the main contributing factors in disabling people [18,34,35]. Gattaca depicts a new social model of disability, displacing the role of current physical norms in a “cascading series of replacements reminiscent of Derrida’s ideas of deferral or deferring—one replacement replacing another” [9] (p. 78). A social model of disability is employed here to show disability as a socially constructed identity. Niccol brings to public attention a provocative discourse on the issues that arise with the blind acceptance of genetic determinism and disabling the able-bodied. The disabled are genetically stigmatized, offspring of “those parents who, for moral or, more likely economic reasons, refrain from tampering with their offspring’s genetic makeup or who fail to abort a deprived fetus” that “condemn their children to a life of routine discrimination” [23] (p. 12). What began as a means to rid society of inheritable diseases has become a way to “design your offspring—the line between health and enhancement blurred forever” [23] (p. 36). The possibility of genetic manipulation extends the scope of ableism, and things we now accept as “normal”, such as myopia, obesity, and addiction, all present opportunities to perfect the species. Thinking back to the day of his birth, Vincent nostalgically remarks that “not so long ago, I would have been considered a perfectly normal, healthy baby. Ten fingers, ten toes. That was all that used to matter” [23] (p. 13). In a world where genetic screening is prerequisite to procreating, however, he is categorized as “[o]ficially [as] ‘In-Valids,’ also known as ‘godchildren’ . . . ‘deficients’, ‘defectives’, ‘geno-junk’ . . . ‘the fucked-up people’” [23] (p. 13). Average physical and intellectual normality is no longer the social ideal with the widespread administration of genomic treatments, causing normal and able bodies by today’s definition to gradually become part of the disabled and disenfranchised. Genetic editing extends the boundaries of ableist ideology to view all unaltered bodies as disabled, potentially opening an oppressive social caste that is more exclusive than the present disability dichotomy. Johnson Cheu’s essay, “De-gene-erates, Replicants and Other Aliens: (Re)defining Disability in Futuristic Film”, addresses future shifts in the social model of disability, arguing “if disability, as a social construction, exists on more than a theoretical plane, disability should be present as a social stigma in the future . . . which occupy a social stigma of being unfit, sub-human, inferior, that shows the very existence of disability as a social construction” [36] (p. 202). Disability in Gattaca remains a fixed category which humanity cannot transcend, “an atavism representing the remainder of normal at the end of normal” [9] (p. 14). Regarding genomics’ impact on the social political as well as economic class structures, Gattaca subverts the belief that genetic engineering betters lives for those who live with disabilities with an emphasis on the dissonance between promised potential and social reality. Unscreened births are categorized as “the ‘healthy ill’. They don’t actually have anything yet—they may never. But since few of the pre-conditions can be cured or reversed, it is easier to treat them as if they were already sick” [23] (p. 37). Genetic editing led to an amplified expression of ableism in human society, by decreeing those we deem normal by today’s standards the healthy disabled, “an unfinished and inherently malfunctioning organism” [8] (p. 260). Niccol predicts a future when our entire population is presumed to be in need of a cure. An “error free” biological profile becomes the sole determinant of ableism, an eradication of the “norm” we are accustomed to leads to further polarization of social and economic classes. Vincent’s self-perception is severely influenced by those surrounding him, a continuous undermining of his efforts in life while “from an early age I came to think of myself as others thought of me—chronically ill. Every skinned knee and runny nose treated as if it were life-threatening” [23] (p. 13). Niccol articulates genetic technology’s impact on society, examining how fundamentals in labor, class, and disability are redefined through the rise of genomics to form “a relation of power and substitution continuing from the social to the genetic” [9] (p. 81). For better or worse, genetic manipulation pushes the boundaries of what is previously considered as the human norm; all bodies are seen as “limited, defective and in need of constant improvement beyond species-typical boundaries” [37] (p. 254).

#### The alt is a centering of disabled perspectives through crip technoscience

Hamraie and Fritsch 19 (Aimi Hamraie is an Associate Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society at Vanderbilt University, Kelly Fritsch works in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, , Crip Technoscience Manifesto, https://catalystjournal.org/index.php/catalyst/article/view/29607, 4/1/19)

Disabled people are experts and designers of everyday life. But we also harness technoscience for political action, refusing to comply with demands to cure, fix, or eliminate disability. Attentive to the intersectional workings of power and privilege, we agitate against independence and productivity as requirements for existence. Building upon earlier work defining crip technoscience as politicized design activism (Hamraie, 2015, 2017), we articulate four political commitments of crip technoscience as a field of critical scholarship, practice, and activism.2In framing crip technoscience as such, we follow feminist technoscience studies by describing both a realm of practice and a field of knowing that has emerged from it. Crip technoscience braids together two provocative concepts: “crip,” the non-compliant, anti-assimilationist position that disability is a desirable part of the world, and “technoscience,” the co-production of science, technology, and political life (Jasanoff, 2004; Murphy, 2012). Crip theory centers disability as a locus of resistance against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (McRuer, 2006)and “ablenationalism” (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015), agitating against liberal assimilation and inclusion practices bymarkingdisability as a desirably generativeand creativerelational practice (Fritsch, 2015a).We seek to bring crip theory and feminist technoscience into closer contact, exploring their generative frictions. In some respects, the field of

disability studies has been entangled with science and technology studies (STS)—and feminist STS in particular—since its origins, especially through its critiques of biomedicine and militarism and in its embrace of situated epistemologies.In naming crip technoscience, we invoke long histories of feminist, queer, anti-racist, and disability collaborative praxis, such as in technoscience projects engaging Universal Design, sensory engineering, reproductive justice, and HIV/AIDS activism.2However, to date, criptheorists have had limited engagement with the criticalconcept of technoscience, particularly as it is used in feminist STS to mean the productive and non-innocent entanglement of scientific knowing and technological making.3This limited engagement has yielded an ahistorical position that science, technology, and medicine are anathema to crip world-remaking, ignoring disabled peoples’ ongoing, creative, and open-ended appropriations of science, technology,and medicine,particularlyinacts of protest and “epistemic activism” (Hamraie, 2012, 2017, p. 132). Crip technoscience thus calls forth Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha’s concept of “crip science” (2018, p. 69)to highlight the skills, wisdom, resources, and hacks disabled people utilize for navigating and altering inaccessible worlds. In pushing crip technoscience as a field of research and a practice of critical “knowing-making” (Hamraie,2017, p. 99), we conjure frictional practices of access production, acknowledging that science and technology can be used to both produce and dismantle injustice. As a field of study, crip technoscience begins from the feminist politics of technoscientific “non-innocence”(Haraway, 1991), acknowledging that many of the technologies that have enabled disabled people to gain access to the social world have been produced through military-industrial research and development, imperial and colonial relations, and ecological destruction, all of which contribute to the uneven debilitation of human and non-human life (Erevelles, 2011; Fritsch, 2015b; Kafer, 2013; Puar, 2017). Nevertheless, we contend that technoscience can be a transformative tool for disability justice.We contrast crip technosciencewith mainstream “disability technoscience” as a field of traditional expertrelations andpractices concerned with designingfordisabledpeople rather than withor bydisabled people. In mainstream disability technoscience, such fixes are understood as de facto goods, services for (supposedly) unfortunate disabled people, and ultimately depoliticized. Disability technoscience positions enhancement and capacitation as progressive moves to overcome disability. “Hackathons” led by charity organizations embody innovation-for-innovation’s sake and definedisability as a problemin search of a solution (Wong, 2015a,2015b). Disabled people are often treated purely as clients or users. For example, the organization Tikkun Olam Makers (TOM) describes disabled people as “need knowers” and non-disabled designers and engineers as “solution experts.” Riffing on the term special needs, which associates disabled people with minority interests outside of majority norms, these designations reinforce the division between disabled people as passive recipients of access or assistive technologies and non-disabled designers, developers, and technologists as experts. Disability technoscience reinforces the sense that disabled people are not already making, hacking, and tinkering with existing material arrangements. Disability is cast as an object of innovation discourse, rather than as a driver of technological change. Melanie Yergeau (2014) historicizes mainstream disability “hacktivism,” arguing that hackathons have become the “new telethon” in that they frame “disability as pitiable and in need of remediation.”4In response, Yergeau invokes “criptastic hacking”as a “disability-led movement, rather than a series of apps and patches and fixes designed by non-disabled people who cannot even be bothered to talk with disabled people.” Criptastic hacking highlights crip technoscience asa field of relations, knowledges, and practices that enables the flourishing of crip ways of producing and engaging the material world

## Links

### Link --- AI

#### AI development homogenizes disability and labels disabled bodies as “Burdens”

**Shew 20 -** (Ashley Shew 20 ; Ashley Shew is an Associate Professor in Science, Technology, and Society at Virginia Tech, where she participates in the STS PhD program, the Medicine & Society minor, the Disability Studies minor, the Bioethics graduate certificate, and Integrative Graduate Education Program on Regenerative Medicine. Published: Mar 1, 2020 ; Ableism, Technoableism, and Future AI. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10165545. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 39.1 Web. doi:10.1109/MTS.2020.2967492.) Dōgen+Barney)

The latest set of technological solutions to the perceived problems of disabled people is Artificial Intelligence and machine learning. But like other technologies discussed in this essay, Artificial Intelligence research and AIs currently under development contain several inscriptions of technoableism that I want to warn against. I also want to gesture to an emerging frame for considering appropriate disability technology, called Crip Technoscience [16]. The current mood is one of optimism about machine learning and Artificial Intelligence for disability applications. Headlines scream about it: “How AI Could Transform the Lives of Disabled People” [10], “How Artificial Intelligence Can Help With Disabilities” [19], and “Artificial Intelligence Poised to Improve Lives of People with Disabilities” [46]. Sometimes these headlines acknowledge AI’s potential for helping people as they age (correctly assuming that older folks are more likely to have disabilities), hyping the potential for robot caregivers and AI emotional support “animals” — AI that can take the place of human carers or friends, often at a lower financial cost: “Artificial Intelligence Could Improve How We Age” [29], “Can China Win the Artificial Intelligence Race by Serving the Elderly?” [18], and “Robot Caregivers are Saving the Elderly from Lives of Loneliness” [43]. These breathless headlines make clear the assumptions that ground the articles that follow them — assumptions about what it is to be disabled and what it is to age. (These articles tend to lump disability and aging together, and I therefore examine the two together, but there are important differences between these demographic groups in terms of stigma, access, convenience, societal narrative, and consideration.) Like earlier technological interventions on disabled lives, these technologies rely on assumptions about the disabled and aging individual rather than the environment. For example, ideas about the importance of independence factor heavily into coverage of AI for disabled and older folks, and are particularly clear in discussions around autonomous vehicles, companion robots (like Paro), home-based applications (like Alexa), and caretaking robots. All of these technologies emphasize aging and disability as problems for individual consumers, rather than problems for society.12 Why should the lack of accessible transport for people who cannot drive be a problem for the non-driver rather than for society? Why should the loneliness and isolation experienced by people who cannot easily leave their homes be solved by in-home robots rather than by better planning and infrastructure within our communities? AI designers are clearly focused on changing the individual to fit the environment rather than the other way around. For example, many of the “conveniences” offered by AI applications are mostly conveniences for the benefit of the user’s family, rather than the users themselves. These technologies are framed as unburdening families from worry by enabling them to remotely monitor or check in on their loved one’s condition; as reducing the financial costs of hiring human caretakers; and as combating the user’s isolation and loneliness, thus requiring fewer visits from family members. When AI technology is framed as helping the family, it positions disabled and old people as recipients of care rather than as agents in their own lives, and it decenters them and their experiences, instead moving the nondisabled family members into the center of the story (which also fails to recognize that disabled people can have disabled family members and can be caregivers themselves).

This same centering of ability is produced by the narratives’ focus on independence as the main goal of disability design. Indeed, the nearly obsessive focus on independence is another “tell” for ableism. As Elliott Kukla writes: We are born needing care and die needing care, and I am no exception. At brief moments in the middle of life, we hold the illusion of independence, but we are always driving on roads we did not build, eating foods we did not pick or raise. Allowing the illusion of my own independence to drop away unmasked a fundamental truth of being human [24]. This sentiment echoes throughout current disability studies: we are all interdependent, and independence has always already been an illusion.13 But disabled and old people have often needed to advocate for independence, because they have historically been the subject of laws, de facto rules, and public norms that deny them full citizenship, access, and opportunity to participate in public life. For example, early disability activism of the 1970s and 1980s produced a movement called the independent living movement. The name — independent living — indicates a reaction to the historical framing of disabled people as completely dependent, as objects to be moved around by nondisabled people. Despite the name, this movement was not about independence in the sense of isolation, total responsibility for one’s own needs, and total avoidance of inconvenience to nondisabled people — the values that underpin current narratives about AI. Instead, the movement was about the right to a public life, a life outside of institutions — an interdependent life. It demanded community living (the slogan “Our Homes, Not Nursing Homes!”), access to education and to public spaces (schools, grocery stores, shops, etc.), vocational services (to enable people to work), and assistive technologies (to help people move and remain outside of institutionalized and segregated care). The independent living movement demanded only that disabled people have the same autonomy, rights, and freedoms that nondisabled people enjoy. Interdependence (neither isolationist independence nor dependence) is a central value in the Crip Technoscience Manifesto. It is the second item on the list: “Crip technoscience is committed to interdependence as a political technology” [17, p. 12], and the Manifesto itself, which is “premised on interdependence,” was written to describe the “core values” of crip technoscience. According to Hamraie and Fritsch [16, 17], crip technoscience blends critical disability studies with approaches from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). It anticipates a world in which disabled people are seen as experts about their experiences and the materiality and context of their bodies. Crip technoscience anticipates accessible futures that work not toward cure or normalization but toward freedom. AI as a disability technology also presents particular problems of data privacy, especially given the long and ongoing history of the policing of disabled bodies. For example, the recently deployed Electronic Visit Verification (EVV) technologies enable personal care attendants (PCAs) to clock in and out of their home health visits. Under EVV, these personal care attendants, who provide physical support for disabled people to accomplish daily tasks (toileting, prepping food, getting in a wheelchair), are issued mobile phones to track their time on the job. But disability activists express worry about the scope of the monitoring enabled by this technology. As disability activist and filmmaker Dominick Evans tweeted: It is a pure violation of the civil liberties and personal freedom of disabled people across the United States. Our PCAs are now being equipped with something equivalent to an ankle bracelet by the US government! They are giving [sic] phones that have cameras in the front and the back so they can track exactly what all of us who need homecare are doing. They could record any conversation. These devices have to stay in our homes, at all times. We’ll never know when they are recording, and we don’t know who has access to them beyond the monitoring company, and government agencies. It’s a huge threat to the personal safety of disabled people who require home care [12] The use of EVV technology is a huge invasion of privacy — an invasion that would not be permitted for many segments of society.14 Can you imagine if any nondisabled, noncriminal citizen was required by the government to allow a device with the potential to monitor them in their homes at all times? This is precisely what some of the proposed AI technologies will do. And disabled people — especially disabled people who are multiply minoritized, whose identities are more carefully scrutinized by others — are rightfully concerned. Our society does not value the privacy of older people and disabled people,15 and many of the AIs in development sacrifice this privacy in favor of the peace of mind of presumably nondisabled caretakers — an assumption that disabled and old people are not agents in their own right.

Experiences of Real Disabled People

The crux of the problem is that AI designs, like other technologies meant to address disability issues, are often spearheaded by people not deeply embedded in the disability community —people who simply imagine what it might be like to be disabled or elderly rather than base their design on the experiences and needs of real disabled people. These designers, who are usually ignorant of the larger history of disability, often reinscribe ableism in their designs, further stigmatizing and marginalizing disabled people through monitoring or tracking or decision-making by proxy. The typical framing of new technologies as promoting independence is based on a lie: the lie that any of us is truly independent. These technologies are touted as empowering, but designing technologies without consulting their user base is the ultimate in disempowerment. One of the commitments of the Crip Technoscience Manifesto is to center “the work of disabled makers and knowers” [17, p. 7]. Tech designers’ reliance on their imagination of what it is to be disabled16 keeps the focus on individual functioning and limitation, rather than addressing the larger context — the poor infrastructure and social stigmas that work against the full participation of disabled people in society. This is not an either/or situation: we can both work to support individuals’ particular interests and needs and work to create a more accessible world for allpeople. But we cannot do either if we continue to design technologies that reinscribe the “cure” or normalization of individual disabled bodies and minds instead of making worlds more conducive to our existence.

### Link --- Biotech

#### **Biotech fails to empower disabled folk.**

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444816642754>, 4/19/16, Buck)

In the many formulations of digital media, Internet, or new media studies, “critical cyberculture studies” is notable for its attempt to put “cultural difference—human elements of race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and disability … front and center, informing our research questions, frameworks, and findings” (Silver, 2006: 8). Despite such rhetoric, disability was marginalized by cyberculture studies and other strands of Internet studies in their first decade, either through its use as metaphor or through its invisibility. In much of these literatures, disability has been a concretizing metaphor, used to illustrate abstract theories and not interrogated for its own political baggage and relation to lived experiences and identities. This recalls what literary and disability scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2001) have argued about the use of disability in fiction, where it serves as a “narrative prosthesis,” a motivating malady that drives further storytelling. In both cases, disability is abstracted and used to advance other ideas. The clearest example of such metaphorical use of disability lies in cyborg theory, where it appeared “only as example, not as critical category” (Kafer, 2013: 105). As described in Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” the cyborg represented the increasingly blurred boundaries between human and animal, human and machine, in postmodernity. Haraway (1991) invoked disability to describe the pleasures of blending the human and the other, suggesting that “perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices,” and that “machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves” (p. 154). Similarly, Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (1991) opened their anthology by suggesting that “the highly developed technoculture of the handicapped” would be important for the development of cyborg theory (p. xvi); this possibility was, however, unrealized in their anthology. Incorporation of actual experiences with prosthetics could have offered depth to these speculative cyborg futures, but it could also have troubled them, as lived experiences of disability and assistive technology are often frustrating, painful, or stigmatizing rather than politically liberating. In the few cases in which scholars considered experiences of disability in concert with cyborg theory, their findings were mixed. For instance, d/Deaf individuals who received cochlear implants did not experience this as an empowering cyborg identity but as a troubling of their community identity and sense of self (Cherney, 1999). The invisibility of disability in Internet studies is evident when we turn a critical eye to the case of Joan. Although numerous scholars took up this case in relation to gender, sexuality, postmodern identity, and online disembodiment, analysis through the lens of disability was sorely lacking. Turkle focused on the boundaries between identity play as a healthy form of experimentation and identity deception as betrayal. Howard Rheingold invoked this story as part of a larger discussion of online communities’ experiences of trust and deception. O’Brien used the story to argue the importance of gender in organizing interpersonal interactions online and offline. For Mark Poster, as well, the case was one of gender deception, demonstrating how gender could be reinscribed online. In Roseanne Allucquère Stone’s chapter, “The Cross-Dressing Psychiatrist,” she presented this story as an illustration of the flexibility of postmodern identity, an argument that both renders disability invisible as a lived phenomenon and treats it metaphorically. Such appearances—but analytic irrelevance—of disability in Internet studies led Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell (2003) to suggest that Internet studies and related fields retained a conceptualization of disability as deficiency that obscured its function as identity and experience (p. 115). In their analysis of Joan, and related literature in cyberculture studies, Goggin and Newell provided a rare illustration of what disability studies could offer to scholars of Internet and new media culture. They wrote that Stone, in particular, “fails to identify the way in which [a medical discourse of disability] fundamentally shapes her own analysis and taken-for-granted views of … the disabled body” (Goggin and Newell, 2003: 113). While scholars readily explored the diverse personas adopted by online users in various contexts, Goggin and Newell (2003) noted reliance on a “fixed, reified identity position” (p. 114) regarding disability, an assumption that disability could only be performed in a limited fashion. The postmodern fluidity of cyberculture studies did not extend to disability, and the lived experiences of disability online were rarely analyzed, with metaphorical uses and uninterrogated anecdotes serving as the basis for theory. Goggin and Newell’s Digital Disability offered serious study of uses of the Internet by people with disabilities, the limitations of technology regarding disability access, and the formation of disability cultures online. It laid the groundwork for future studies of disability online, many of which have addressed both online cultures and the offline structures of power that shape technologies (Adam and Kreps, 2009; Ellcessor, 2016; Ellis and Kent, 2010; Goggin and Noonan, 2006; Jaeger, 2011; Moser, 2006). Although this literature has grown, its insights regarding the interplay of bodies, technologies, and cultural hierarchies of identity have not been widely incorporated into studies of online culture more broadly.

#### The aff is an impossible move to deploy biotech to fix disability that inevitably entrenches ableism

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444816642754>, 4/19/16, Buck)

Despite the common analysis of online media as opportunities for self-exploration or identity experimentation, cyborg hoaxes present disability as a fixed element of identity that may, in turn, be “fixed” by technology that extends an individual beyond their (limited) capacities. In the first place, cyborg hoaxes reproduce stereotypical representations of disability as a fixed element of identity with predictable restrictions. Second, any promise of technology “fixing” disability implies that disability ought to be fixed and reflects an ableist ideology. Disability is presented as a fixed, static, identity marker in cyborg hoaxes. The very use of disability as an excuse, as described above, is indicative of an assumption that disability produces predictable symptoms. The presentation of disability as a static identity marker, with unchanging consequences, reflects assumptions of a dualist and ableist culture, in which ability is contrasted with disability and gradations are largely invisible. Cyborg hoaxes cling tightly to a narrow narrative of disability and limitation, while (as will be discussed later) people with disabilities online exhibit a range of changeable relationships to society, technology, and sexuality. Insofar as technology offers to “fix” disability, it does so through invisibility, enabling people with disabilities to take on non-disabled representations of self. Yet, as media scholars Katie Ellis and Mike Kent (2010) caution, “if people with disability in this sense become invisible in virtual worlds, this could have implications for the visibility of people with disability in broader society” (p. 123). There are strong tendencies to assume the whiteness and maleness of online participants in the absence of complex representations of alternative identities (Nakamura, 2002). An able-bodied perspective is similarly dominant and reinforced by the invisibility of disability online. Kafer (2013) argues that culture often imagines technologically enabled futures as spaces without disability, meaning that “the value of a future that includes disabled people goes unrecognized, while the value of a disability-free future is seen as self-evident” (p. 3). Technology may also “fix” disability by offering access to a social life that is portrayed as otherwise impossible due to disability. Rheingold (1994), for example, wrote that “Joan’s mentor had given her a computer, modem, and a subscription to CompuServe, where Joan instantly blossomed” (p. 165). This statement privileges technology as a means to overcome stigma or isolation, but it relies upon an ignorance of how technologies can reinforce oppression through features that cannot be used by people with disabilities.

### Link --- Cybersecurity

#### The 1acs rhetoric of “crippling” nations infrastructure re entrenches ableism

Rajkumar 20 (Shruti Rajkumar is a journalist and recent graduate of Emerson College, Ableist discourse hurts the disabled community, <https://berkeleybeacon.com/ableist-discourse-hurts-the-disabled-community/#:~:text=Over%20the%20past%20decade%2C%20the,to%20be%20addressed%20by%20society>, 2/11/20, Barney)

In 2009, Spread the Word gained traction in the public school system of Colchester, Connecticut, my hometown, as well as in schools across the country. The campaign spread awareness about the derogatory and negative connotations that the “R-word” holds towards people with cognitive disabilities, and it encouraged people to sign a pledge to stop using it. By 2020, the global campaign gained over 800,000 online pledges, according to its [website](https://www.spreadtheword.global/). The impact of the campaign is undeniable, but what about all of the other ableist slurs that remain embedded within our everyday language and culture? Over the past decade, the use of the “R-word” decreased, however ableist slurs such as “crippling,” “handicap,” “differently-abled” and “wheelchair-bound” remain normalized in our language with complete disregard for the negative connotations they hold toward disabled people, and this needs to be addressed by society. As a member of the disabled community, I’ve always felt uncomfortable seeing these slurs used in conversations, written in books and being thrown around as playful insults between my peers, but because they were so widely used, it was difficult for me to pinpoint why it made me uncomfortable. Unfortunately, this normalization remains because of the lack of awareness surrounding the trauma disabled people face in relation to these slurs. I first became aware of the slur “cripple” in elementary school while watching the 2009 movie adaptation of A Christmas Carol. The original book, published in 1843 by Charles Dickens, refers to Bob Cratchit’s son, nicknamed “Tiny Tim,” as a cripple. During the 19th century, slurs with a variation of the word “cripple” were even more normalized than they are today. However, in the modern age of movie adaptations, the characters still refer to him as a cripple, even though it is an outdated term. Whenever I watched the movie, I got the sense that calling the character a cripple portrayed him as inferior, stemming from an able-centric place of pity, a reflection of how all abled people view disabled people. Consequently, I felt as though I was also viewed this way by those around me. When I hear the word “handicap” used in conversations, it’s usually in reference to the reserved parking spots or to refer to a specific disability. Most people, however, don’t understand the negative implication surrounding this word. On Feb. 5, 2020, former Vice President Joe Biden reflected on his struggle with a stutter throughout his childhood at the CNN Presidential town hall. “You know, stuttering, when you think about it, is the only handicap that people still laugh about,” Biden said. Putting aside the inaccuracy of his statement, he should have avoided the term “handicap” because “disabled” is the preferred and politically correct term. When I hear people using ableist slurs, they’re usually not in a hateful context. With the word “crippling,” I normally hear it used in conversations to describe mental illnesses, such as anxiety or depression, as a way of emphasizing the intensity of their illness. However, people can describe their mental illnesses without offending other communities. For example, instead of saying “crippling anxiety,” they can say “overwhelming anxiety.” Similarly, ableist slurs can simply be replaced by more politically correct terms. “Accessible” should replace “handicap,” “disabled” should replace “differently-abled” and “wheelchair-user” should replace “wheelchair-bound.” Even if the use of ableist slurs isn’t always used as an attack on disabled people, the lack of awareness about them further permits their normalization in our culture and language. Consequently, they act as a microaggression that ultimately adds to the ableism faced by an already marginalized community. Today, society is making strides in omitting the slurs and outdated terms that have a history of offending marginalized communities. The disabled community deserves that same respect.

#### Disability metaphors are used to naturalize nations positions as inferior to the United States

McRuer 10 (Robert McRuer is an American theorist who has contributed to fields in transnational queer and disability studies, “Reflections on Disability in Haiti”, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/398278/summary>, January 2010, Barneys)

Illness and contagion are only part of the story of Haiti's metaphorization, however. Even the quickest survey of global headlines following the disaster reveals (with predictable frequency) reports that the earthquake had 'crippled' the nation, the city, the infrastructure, the agricultural or tourist industries, or humanitarian efforts. Hospital and emergency responses had been, in these reports, 'paralyzed' and the government, according to no less than former U.S. president Bill Clinton (tapped by President Barack Obama to assist in the crisis), had been, "first of all, disabled." "When this emergency passes," Clinton insisted, "then we know Haiti is going to have to get back on its feet again. And we want to be a part of that" (qtd. in Fabian).

These readily available metaphors of both disability and able-bodiedness (Clinton's comments obviously invoking a Haiti-to-come that is nondisabled, healthy, robust, standing on two feet) are in part simply journalistic stock-in-trade following [disasters](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&hitCount=1&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA243524912&docType=Essay&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CA243524912&searchId=R1&userGroupName=umuser&inPS=true) but are, I am arguing, also particularly entrenched in relation to Haiti. Long before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's position in the global economy had been conceptualized through disability metaphors--after "two hundred years of crippling debt," the already "feeble" economy has been "knocked flat" by repeated disasters (Flaherty; Dougherty and Shwiff). This terminology has had the dual effect of naturalizing Haiti's position as the poorest country in the western hemisphere and disallowing--as in other cultural locations where banal disability metaphors circulate readily--other ways of imagining embodiment in general and disability in particular in this location.

### Link --- Data

#### The aff use of empirical and “unbias” data -- Big data is undermined with racist and ableist assumptions

Gillborn et al 18 (David Gillborn, Paul Warmington & Sean Demack (2018) QuantCrit: education, policy, ‘Big Data’ and principles for a critical race theory of statistics, Race Ethnicity and Education, 21:2, 158-179, DOI: 10.1080/13613324.2017.1377417, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2017.1377417> ) // RB

Policy-makers, the media, and many academics treat quantitative material as if it is fundamentally different and superior to qualitative data. Numbers are assumed to report ‘the facts’; they are seen as authoritative, neutral, dispassionate, and objective. Indeed, governments do not use numbers merely to describe the world, they increasingly use statistics as an essential part of the technology by which they seek to re/shape educational systems. In this way, numbers play a key role in how inequality is shaped, legitimized, and protected. This has been called ‘policy as numbers’ (Rose 1999; Ozga and Lingard 2007; Rizvi and Lingard 2010): neo-liberalism has enhanced the significance of numbers and statistics as technologies of governance, as central to what Power (1997) calls the rise of the ‘audit society’ and what Neave (1998) has called ‘the evaluative state’. (Lingard 2011, 359)1 Numbers are increasingly used to justify policy priorities and to label teachers, schools, districts, and even entire countries, as educational successes and failures. National testing programs, such as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) reforms in the US and the use of school performance tables in England, have popularized the idea that numbers can be used to expose (and change) failing schools (Gillborn and Youdell 2000; Darling-Hammond 2007; Barber 2012). For example, across the globe politicians and pressure-groups frequently try to make their case by quoting results from PISA (Program of International Student Assessment) – which is run by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Prominent examples exist in the States, the UK and Australia (see Lingard, Creagh, and Vass 2012). Countries’ positions in the PISA tables are often cited as if they unambiguously and accurately represent the relative quality of schooling in different nations (despite their very different populations and education systems). And yet the commentaries rarely include any detail about the relatively small samples (less than 200 schools in all but one of the US returns since 2000)(NCES n.d.); the selective curricular coverage of the tests (in reading, math, and science); nor the fact that students in different countries sometimes take different assessments or miss certain assessments altogether (Stewart 2013). Despite these severe limitations, the UK government frequently cites PISA results as evidence of the need for change (cf. Department for Education (DfE) 2015, 8) and has stated that it will ‘measure the increased performance of the school system as a whole by reference to international tables of student attainment, such as PISA’ (quoted in Scott 2016). Compare the confident use of PISA (below), by the then-Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove, and the more circumspect view offered by an academic critic: Since the 1990s our performance in these league tables has been at best, stagnant, at worst declining. In the latest results we are 21st amongst 65 participants in the world for science, 23rd for reading and 26th for mathematics. For all the well-intentioned efforts of past governments we are still falling further behind the best-performing school systems in the world. (Gove 2013) ‘There are very few things you can summarise with a number and yet Pisa claims to be able to capture a country’s entire education system in just three of them. It can’t be possible.’ Dr Hugh Morrison, Queen’s University Belfast (quoted in Stewart 2013).

Numbers and accountability On both sides of the Atlantic, policy-makers have argued that statistics will allow greater ‘accountability’ in education. But the thinking behind such claims is flawed in numerous ways. As Linda Darling-Hammond (2007) has noted, for example, under NCLB the numerous wider structural inequities that shape educational outcomes are ignored by focusing attention at the school level: … the wealthiest US public schools spend at least 10 times more than the poorest schools … Although the Act orders schools to ensure that 100% of students test at levels identified as ‘proficient’ … the small per-pupil dollar allocation the law makes to schools serving low-income students is well under 10% of schools’ total spending, far too little to correct these conditions (247–8) Additionally, the use of quantitative measures as a form of accountability assumes that the measures are valid, that is, that the recorded data bear some relevance to the issue/s that lie behind the targets. But there is often scope for cheating and some high-profile cases have emerged. In England, for example, documented cases include teachers altering students’ work and a school that removed low-attaining students from its official roll in advance of high-stakes testing, thereby artificially raising the proportion of students deemed ‘successful’ (Harding 2015). In the US, David Hursh notes that gaming the system can produce considerable rewards: Rodney Paige, as superintendent of the Houston Independent School District (and later chosen to be President [GW] Bush’s first Secretary of Education) … [ordered] principals to not list a student as dropping out but as having left for another school or some reason other than dropping out. Such creative book-keeping resulted in the district claiming a greatly reduced dropout rate of 1.5% in 2001–02 and winning a national award for excellence (Hursh 2007, 302) Numbers and equity In the UK, government policy puts numbers at the heart of its proclaimed strategy to create a fairer society. The Conservative Party, which formed the dominant partner in the Coalition Government (2010–2015), went into the 2010 general election with arguments about ‘transparency’ threaded throughout their Party Manifesto. This included the promise, emphasized as a bold subheading, to ‘Publish data so the public can hold government to account’ (Conservative Conservative Party 2010, 69). Subsequently, the rhetoric was translated into a policy that envisaged ‘the public’ using statistics to understand, challenge and then change the behavior of public authorities, including the Government itself: ‘Our proposals,’ the Government Equalities Office (GEO) has said, ‘use the power of transparency to help public bodies to fulfil the aims of the Equality Duty to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different groups. This means that public bodies will be judged by citizens on the basis of clear information about the equality results they achieve … Public authorities will have flexibility in deciding what information to publish, and will be held to account by the people they serve.’ (quoted by Instead Consultancy 2011) This approach embodies a series of assumptions that imbue numbers with an almost magical status and power. First, it is assumed that relevant and useful data will be made available (despite the selection being in the gift of the very authorities that ‘the public’ are expected to challenge). Second, this model of transparent data and active citizenship assumes that the citizenry has the time, resources, and expertise to access the data and then analyze it. Finally, the approach takes for granted that public bodies will automatically change their behavior if the data reveal poor ‘equality results’. Unfortunately, in the real world, none of these assumptions is true.

Statistics do not simply lie around waiting for interested citizens to pick them up and use them. Numbers are no more obvious, neutral, and factual than any other form of data. Statistics are socially constructed in exactly the same way that interview data and survey returns are constructed i.e. through a design process that includes, for example, decisions about which issues should (and should not) be researched, what kinds of question should be asked, how information is to be analyzed, and which findings should be shared publicly. Even given the very best intentions (and notwithstanding the opportunity for game-playing and ‘creative book-keeping’ of the sort already documented above) at every stage there is the possibility for decisions to be taken that obscure or misrepresent issues that could be vital to those concerned with social justice. In view of the limits of space, a single – but important – example will suffice. It concerns racial justice and the question of access to, and achievement in, UK higher education. It is a scandal that ethnic minority kids are more likely to go to university than poor white ones The Telegraph (Kirkup 2015) White British pupils least likely to go to university, says research The Guardian (Khomami 2015) White British pupils fall behind ethnic groups in race for university: All minorities now more likely to go into higher education Daily Mail (Doughty 2015) These headlines appeared in the British daily press in November 2015 when an economic think tank (the Institute for Fiscal Studies – IFS) publicized a review of government figures showing the proportion of young people going into the university from different ethnic groups (Crawford and Greaves 2015). First, as we might expect when applying a CRT perspective that is sensitive to the positioning of White people at the heart of contemporary politics, it is striking that the relatively low rate for White students is the angle highlighted by all news outlets regardless of their political positioning. Including, for example, the most left-wing (Guardian) and right-wing (Telegraph and Mail) parts of the mainstream British media. A second important aspect to this story, that may surprise some readers, is that there is nothing new in the fact that White students are less likely to enter British universities than their peers in most minoritized groups. This pattern was already known 18 years before these headlines: ‘relative to their share in the population … ethnic minorities overall are now better represented in HE than whites’ (Coffield and Vignoles 1997 original emphasis). From the perspective of this paper, focusing on the mis/uses of numbers in race analyses, perhaps the most important aspect of the IFS report, and the associated newspaper headlines, is that a focus on access statistics in isolation gives an extremely partial, indeed biased, view of race and Higher Education in Britain. Simply looking at who goes to university ignores long-standing and significant race inequities in the status of the universities attended and the level of final degree achievement.

Figure 1 shows the likelihood of attending an elite research-intensive university in the UK (the so-called ‘Russell Group’ of universities).2 White and minoritized students appear to have roughly similar chances of attending elite universities if all minoritized students are lumped together in a single ‘non-White’ group, usually referred to as BME in the UK (Black and Minority Ethnic). However, if the minoritized students are disaggregated into smaller and more meaningful groups, some important differences emerge. Figure 2 compares the proportion of White young people entering Russell Group universities against the rate for the most- and least-likely minority ethnic groups, Indian and Black Caribbean students respectively.3 White British students are almost five times more likely to gain access to elite

Figure 1 and Figure 2. Omitted

research-intensive universities than their peers of Black Caribbean background. This is a sizeable inequality of opportunity but is invisible in calculations that simply aggregate all minoritized students (such as Figure 1) or which look at access to all universities regardless of their standing (such as the national headlines quoted above). The inflammatory headlines that proclaimed the ‘scandal’ of White rates of access to university (above) draw attention away from a further facet of race inequity in the system i.e. differing levels of achievement between ethnic groups. Table 1 shows the proportions of students in each main ethnic group attaining the different classes of degree available at the end of their undergraduate studies; ranging from the very best result (a first class degree) through to a ‘third’ or ‘pass’ degree classification. White students are more likely to gain a ‘First’ than any other group (22.4%); Black students are the least likely to be awarded first class degrees (8.7% of Black students overall). This means that the odds of White undergraduates achieving the highest degree classification are around three times higher than their Black peers.4 This is a significant ethnic inequality but, perhaps because the beneficiaries are White, it goes entirely unremarked in the press furore about the overall access statistics (above). It is clear, therefore, that there is nothing obvious, neutral nor simple about education statistics and race. In this section, we have reviewed official data that describe differences in university access and achievement in relation to the ethnic origin of undergraduates in British universities. The government, an economic think tank, and the mainstream media all chose to highlight the apparent under-representation of White students (when looking at access across the entire system). This played into the ongoing high-profile political and media narrative that paints White people as race-victims in contemporary Britain (see Gillborn 2008, 2010b; Sveinsson 2009 for critical commentaries). But a very different picture emerges if the data are questioned in relation to a critical understanding of past race inequities in education. Such a perspective prompts us to explore differences in the status of institutions and the levels of achievement at the end of higher education. In both cases, White students appear to do rather well and, in terms of achievement, better than every other group. Indeed, there is perhaps scope for further headlines questioning what is happening in British higher education when the ethnic group that is least likely to go to university nevertheless enjoys the best chance of achieving the top grade. Were this a minoritized group there might be headlines about ‘scandals’ and shocks but, since the group in question is White, their high attainment fits with the basic expectations of a White supremacist media and polity and so the pattern goes entirely unremarked. Big Data: big trouble? The world’s capacity to store, broadcast and compute information is growing exponentially. The numbers involved have already passed well beyond the scales we are used to in our everyday lives. Counting across all forms of storage, from mobile phone memory to DVD, Blu-Ray and hard disks, we estimate that the world’s installed capacity to store information will reach around 2.5 zettabytes this year … If we stored all this data on DVDs and piled them up, the stack of discs would stretch one-and-a-half times the distance from the earth to the moon. What’s more, this figure is growing by over 50% year-on-year. (Yiu 2012, 10) ‘Big data’ is an increasingly popular phrase used to describe sets of numeric data that are, according to its advocates, simply too huge for traditional forms of human analysis. Big Data

Figure 3 omitted

has become big business. A recent google search for the phrase produced almost 300,000,000 hits5 and governments on both sides of the Atlantic are investing heavily in the technology and talking up its transformative powers: Big Data is a Big Deal … Today, the Obama Administration is announcing the ‘Big Data Research and Development Initiative.’ By improving our ability to extract knowledge and insights from large and complex collections of digital data, the initiative promises to help accelerate the pace of discovery in science and engineering, strengthen our national security, and transform teaching and learning. (WhiteHouse.gov 2012) It is estimated that the big data market will benefit the UK economy by £216 billion and create 58,000 new jobs before 2017 … Universities and Science Minister David Willetts said: ‘Big data is 1 of the 8 great technologies of the future and a priority for government. It has the potential to transform public and private sector organisations, drive research and development, increase productivity and innovation, and enable market-changing products and services.’ (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2014) Big Data advocates promote a hard sell about the fabulous powers of Big Data. They describe a world where new possibilities are revealed by an analysis entirely driven by machines and where, most significantly, theories and human reasoning are rendered obsolete because the ‘numbers speak for themselves’: the following extract is from an article in Wired magazine, entitled ‘The End of Theory’, which did much to popularize the idea: This is a world where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. (Anderson 2008) The argument that numbers can now ‘speak for themselves’ is a popular refrain in Big Data discussions. Speaking on BBC radio in 2013, for example, author Kenneth Cukier stated: ‘We have to let the data speak for itself. (…) When we trust the data – look at the data – it is a little bit less biased – in some respects, not in all respects – than we are. And therefore it can find correlations that we simply, as human beings, can’t because we have limited capacity (…) the vast amount of data has expanded, we now have to give it to the machine to do what it does best, and that is parse through it to come up with insights.’6 Cukier’s emphasis on correlations echoes part of Anderson’s argument from Wired: ‘Correlation is enough.’ We can stop looking for models. We can analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might show. (Anderson 2008) This is a deliberate and self-conscious rejection of the traditional warning that correlation should not be mistaken for causation. When Big Data advocates ask us to ‘trust the data’ they paint a picture of analysis as an almost mystical process that takes place inside machines and is too complex for human beings to comprehend: ‘We can throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot’ (Anderson 2008). As we noted at the very start of this paper, however, algorithms are not free from bias: ‘Even algorithms are biased against black men’ (Naughton 2016; see also Larson et al. 2016). And the reason that algorithms can be racist is that they are created and interpreted by human beings, many of whom share commonly held racist stereotypes. As we have argued above, all data is manufactured and all analysis is driven by human decisions. Although ‘Big Data’ advocates proclaim its insight and authority with almost evangelical fervor, the limits of the approach can be found lurking in the small print. For example, in a book whose subtitle proclaims Big Data as a ‘revolution that will transform how we live, work and think’, Cukier and his co-author accept (contrary to Anderson’s proclamation of the ‘end of theory’) that: ‘… big-data analysis is based on theories, we can’t escape them. They shape both our methods and our results. It begins with how we select the data. Our decisions may be driven by convenience: Is the data readily available? Or by economics: Can the data be captured cheaply? Our choices are influenced by theories. What we choose influences what we find … (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013, 72 emphasis added). This echoes our key argument that all data gathering and analysis is shaped by theories and beliefs that are susceptible to racial bias. In the next part of the paper, we set out some ideas for how the analysis of quantitative data might usefully be informed by the principles of Critical Race Theory (CRT)

#### AI data is being leaked and used to discriminate against people with disability

Marks 19 (Mason Marks, Harvard Law School; Yale Law School; University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law; Leiden Law School, Center for Law and Digital Technologies Date Written: February 19, 2019 I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., Disability, Health, Law and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2020)

Many people with disabilities rely on technology to communicate, socialize, and navigate physical and virtual environments. For example, people with vision impairments use assistive devices to identify objects while walking.6 People with mobility impairments use voice-recognition software to access the Internet and draft emails.7 Tom Gruber, a cocreator of Apple’s AI-powered personal assistant Siri, claims his invention helps disabled people engage with society in ways that nondisabled people take for granted.8 These assistive technologies can increase the abilities of people with physical and mental impairments. However, they also serve as continuous sources of EMD, putting people with disabilities at increased risk for discrimination. Imagine an individual named John who is paraplegic and uses a wheelchair. John may never have disclosed his disability publicly. Yet algorithms can infer his disability through his digital traces. After profiling John and sorting him into the category “wheelchair user,” marketing algorithms may serve him targeted ads designed to appeal to people in that category, such as ads for wheelchairs and related accessories. This example seems benign, yet there is a darker side to this type of categorization. On August 13, 2018, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development filed a formal complaint alleging that Facebook engaged in discrimination against people with disabilities, in violation of the FHA, by allowing advertisers to exclude people with disabilities from receiving housing-related advertisements.9 According to the complaint, Facebook enabled advertisers to prevent users from seeing ads if the users had been sorted into categories such as interested in “assistance dog” and interested in “deaf culture.”10 Similarly, John’s categorization as a wheelchair user could be used to exclude him from receiving ads for employment, housing, and other resources. In addition to violating antidiscrimination laws such as the FHA, excluding people with disabilities from receiving these ads strips them of agency and excludes them from participating fully in society. Targeted advertising can also harm people with disabilities more directly. Consider an individual with an eating disorder such as anorexia. Profiling this consumer and serving him customized ads for products such as weight loss pills, laxatives, and stimulants can exacerbate his condition and increase his degree of disability. Targeting ads to consumers based on their unique susceptibilities is called vulnerability-based marketing.11 It exploits people’s physical or mental sensitivities and reinforces patterns of unhealthy behavior. Other examples of vulnerability-based targeted advertising include identifying people with chronic pain or substance use disorders and targeting them with ads for illegal opioids.12 Disability-related EMD is also used in a growing industry called “people analytics” that scores and ranks individuals. Scores are used in a variety of sectors including employment, lending, insurance, education, and public administration. The Chinese government is implementing a social credit system that incorporates data from all spheres of people’s lives. It is intended to reflect people’s trustworthiness, and it governs access to housing, employment, healthcare, transportation, and other resources including potential romantic partners.13 Though the Chinese system may seem shocking to Western societies, elements of the system have already been implemented by American companies.14 Hewlett-Packard pioneered a score called “flight risk” to predict when new or existing employees will quit.15 The score incorporates data on divorce, serious illness, and the frequency and pattern of sick days used. If an employee becomes disabled and uses an increasing number of sick days for medical treatment, the trend will be incorporated into the employee’s flight risk score and could result in early termination. In a second example from human resources, Fortune 500 companies increasingly rely on AI-driven interview tools to rank job applicants. One company called HireVue provides software that analyzes applicants’ facial expressions, tone of voice, and word choice to compare them against the “ideal candidate” in various fields.16 If people with mobility or communication impairments are interviewed by these automated systems, their impairments may negatively impact their rankings compared to other applicants. Disabled job candidates could be screened out of the application process before their materials reach human reviewers.

The above examples may violate the ADA. Title I of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating based on disabilities. However, it puts the burden on employees to identify instances of disability discrimination and report them to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). An employee cannot file a lawsuit against an employer unless the EEOC has had a chance to investigate the claim. Yet instances of algorithmic disability discrimination may be difficult for employees and job applicants to detect. They are often unaware that their performance on the job or in an interview is being analyzed by algorithms. Moreover, the algorithms used to mine EMD and rank employees and job applicants are often maintained as trade secrets, the confidential intellectual property of the companies that develop and use them. Even if the code of these algorithms was released to the public, their logic is often opaque and may be inscrutable even to the engineers who design them. Because automated employment and hiring-related decisions are hidden from employees and job applicants, yet Title I requires them to identify instances of discrimination, Title I is inadequate to prevent algorithmic disability discrimination. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in places of public accommodation, which include private businesses that are generally open to the public. Title III lists twelve categories of businesses that provide public accommodations under the ADA such as hotels, restaurants, and movie theaters. Title III could be used to prevent algorithmic disability discrimination against people using social media platforms and other websites. However, it is unclear whether these companies qualify as places of public accommodation because the categories listed in Title III do not include online companies, and historically, places of public accommodation were brick-and-mortar business. Many online businesses do not fit that mold, and courts have been divided on whether they qualify.17 In National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 18 an internet-based document repository was deemed a place of public accommodation. The US District Court for the District of Vermont reasoned it would not make sense for people to be treated differently by the law if they bought an insurance plan from a brick-and-mortar store or bought the same plan from an online vendor.19 However, in Cullen v. Netflix,20 the US District Court for the Northern District of California disagreed, finding that because Netflix’s services are not connected to any “actual physical place,” Netflix is not subject to the ADA.21 In National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, 22 the US District Court of the District of Massachusetts reached the opposite conclusion.23 The court said excluding companies that deliver services online from the definition of places of public accommodation would frustrate Congress’s intent that people with disabilities “fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.”24 Until the debate over whether internet businesses provide public accommodations is resolved, companies that operate within this legal grey area may lack sufficient incentives to abstain from algorithmic disability discrimination. Like the ADA, HIPAA has limitations when it comes to preventing algorithmic discrimination. It applies only to disability-related information held by traditional healthcare entities and their business associates.25 It does not apply to the growing variety of smartphone apps and websites that collect our digital traces or the algorithms that transform them into disability-related information.26 The legislative history of HIPAA suggests its primary purpose is to protect people’s rights by controlling the inappropriate use of their health information.27 It includes quotes by jurists, writers, and philosophers on the importance of maintaining privacy. According to Janna Malamud Smith, “If we continually, gratuitously, reveal other people’s privacies, we harm them and ourselves, we undermine the richness of the personal life, and we fuel a social atmosphere of mutual exploitation.”28 The ability to mine EMD undermines assumptions on which HIPAA was based and expands the types of entities that have access to medical information. Before making recommendations to regulate algorithmic disability discrimination, I will explain why it is important to protect the privacy and autonomy of people with disabilities by restricting the flow of their personal data.

II. WHY WORRY ABOUT THE DISRUPTED FLOW OF DISABILITY-RELATED DATA? In the twentieth century, great strides were made toward securing rights for people with disabilities, and the passage of the ADA is a landmark in this process.29 However, we are far from achieving full equality.30 To ensure that progress continues to be made, we must observe how emerging technologies affect people with disabilities. There is a growing trend to segment, score, and rank the population based on personal characteristics.31 EMD collected from disabled people can serve as a means of sorting them into categories that are assigned positive or negative weights before being used in automated decision-making. Negatively weighted categories can stigmatize disabled people and contribute to the narrative that disabilities are bad. There are ongoing debates about whether the differences between disabled and nondisabled people should be described as “mere differences” or “bad differences.”32 As we progress further into the Information Age, human decisionmakers are being replaced with software that will increasingly weigh in on this debate. By negatively weighting categories into which disabled people are sorted, algorithms may stigmatize disabled people and screen them out of life opportunities without considering their desires or qualifications. Thus, what may have been deemed mere differences by human decision-makers could be flagged as bad differences by algorithms. The disability literature describes two models that attempt to explain the origins of disabilities. The medical model frames mental and physical impairments as health problems requiring treatment. According to the model, disabilities result from the states of people’s bodies and minds, and the primary way to reduce their degree of disability is to correct physical and mental impairments. In contrast, according to the social model of disability, there is nothing inherently negative or disabling about having physical or mental impairments.33 It is within the context of society, where the physical surroundings and social environment shape the experiences of people with impairments, that people’s impairments become disabling and affect their participation in society.34 The social model has changed the way people with mental and physical impairments view themselves. Because it places the blame for disabilities on society, rather than on people with impairments, it serves as a source of self-esteem for many people with disabilities.35 AI increasingly shapes our physical and virtual environments and influences our culture. Under the social model, algorithms that limit the opportunities of people with disabilities contribute to their degree of disability. People with disabilities may wish to define identities for themselves that are independent of their impairments.36 Some people take pride in their disabilities and choose to display them proudly as symbols of their individuality.37 However, others may wish to keep their impairments private and define themselves by other qualities. EMD-based profiling strips them of this option by sorting them into disability categories without their knowledge or consent. Similarly, people with disabilities may wish to make life choices uninfluenced by their disabilities. However, in many cases, communities and societies make decisions for them.38 If a wheelchair user cannot enter a concert hall because the venue lacks a ramp, then the decision to attend the concert has been taken out of the person’s hands. Similarly, if algorithms exclude a person with disabilities from receiving ads for important resources or opportunities, the algorithms have made life decisions for that person. As many industries increasingly shift decision-making responsibilities from humans to AI-based systems, algorithms will increasingly make decisions for disabled people and deprive them of some degree of control over their lives.39 To prevent this from happening, new laws are required to restrict the collection and use of their data.

### Link --- IR

#### Disability metaphors are used to naturalize nations positions as inferior to the United States

McRuer 10 (Robert McRuer is an American theorist who has contributed to fields in transnational queer and disability studies, “Reflections on Disability in Haiti”, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/398278/summary>, January 2010, Barneys)

Illness and contagion are only part of the story of Haiti's metaphorization, however. Even the quickest survey of global headlines following the disaster reveals (with predictable frequency) reports that the earthquake had 'crippled' the nation, the city, the infrastructure, the agricultural or tourist industries, or humanitarian efforts. Hospital and emergency responses had been, in these reports, 'paralyzed' and the government, according to no less than former U.S. president Bill Clinton (tapped by President Barack Obama to assist in the crisis), had been, "first of all, disabled." "When this emergency passes," Clinton insisted, "then we know Haiti is going to have to get back on its feet again. And we want to be a part of that" (qtd. in Fabian).

These readily available metaphors of both disability and able-bodiedness (Clinton's comments obviously invoking a Haiti-to-come that is nondisabled, healthy, robust, standing on two feet) are in part simply journalistic stock-in-trade following [disasters](https://go-gale-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&hitCount=1&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA243524912&docType=Essay&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&pageNum=1&contentSet=GALE%7CA243524912&searchId=R1&userGroupName=umuser&inPS=true) but are, I am arguing, also particularly entrenched in relation to Haiti. Long before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's position in the global economy had been conceptualized through disability metaphors--after "two hundred years of crippling debt," the already "feeble" economy has been "knocked flat" by repeated disasters (Flaherty; Dougherty and Shwiff). This terminology has had the dual effect of naturalizing Haiti's position as the poorest country in the western hemisphere and disallowing--as in other cultural locations where banal disability metaphors circulate readily--other ways of imagining embodiment in general and disability in particular in this location.

## Impacts

### 2NC --- Framing

#### Overcorrect for disability – epistemic exclusion of disables subjects creates an internalization of ableism in both abled and disabled bodies

Katta **Spiel et al 20** [Katta Spiel, Os Keyes, Rua M. Williams, Judith Good, Eva Hornecker, Cynthia L. Bennett, April 25-30th, 2020, “I am just terrified of my future” – Epistemic Violence in Disability Related Technology Research, accessed 7/11/22, -ekh-]

As disabled scholars, we find strength in community and share deep bonds with each other. Within these communities, there is fierce loyalty. There is a strength within that seems dangerous to the outside. We are unruly bodies, classified by society into a plethora of interlocking sets of dysfunction and disorder – because our neurology and our physiology cannot be contained into normative expressions by medicine, by discipline, nor even by our own shame. Though, when it comes to academia, we see a lack of representation [7] and a lack of conditions enabling us in taking part in scholarship with self-determination [24].

As disabled scholars researching, our experiences, particularly when researching technologies within the context of our own conditions, share peculiar commonalities. Be it around physical, sensory, cognitive, or psychological conditions, we find ourselves represented in the literature as objects of inquiry – systematically belittled, disregarded, ignored and dehumanized. Despite several calls for the inclusion of disabled people in technology research about them [30, 48, 54], work that claims inclusive methods continues to distance disabled people from the shared construction of knowledge through tokenistic forms of “voice” that fail to redistribute power and agency to disabled people [4]. Instead, disabled people are often persistently excluded from making meaning about technologies presumably for them [50]. Such epistemic exclusion allows the circulation of implicit bias against disabled subjects as producers of knowledge. Privileging, for example, neurotypical perspectives on neurodivergent needs [49], demarcating the space for technologies almost exclusively to domains of cure, therapy and intervention – all of which are tied to rhetorics removing the intricacies of disabled lives from the range of human experiences [11, 52].

As disabled scholars navigating the academy, we find ourselves related to by our non-disabled peers as a problem, needy, difficult, unruly. We face disbelief in light of our diagnoses (“You don’t really look autistic!”, “How did you get through school with ADHD?”, “Dyscalculia isn’t really a thing, you know?”, “I never would have thought!”), dismissal of access needs as too costly, our complaints being framed as aggression and continuous erasure of our situated, lived expertise as “too much” (“You have to be more appreciative about what came before.”, “We are just learning about all of this!”, “You’re so emotional!”, “If this is a persistent issue for you, maybe the issue isn’t other people.”).

As disabled scholars researching our own conditions, we are deeply hurt. We read about ourselves as disordered, as an emotional, financial and overall burden to the people around us, as incapable of forming social relationships, undesirable, less than, limited, incapable, as fundamentally lacking—echoing the worst nightmares of our internalized ableism [10]. The texts are full of the “language of the helping professions” [16]; even though we assume that authors do mean well, those who do not position their work to disability as politicized may be subscribing to a notion of doing good, while not realizing and reflecting that what is allowed to be understood as “doing good” is reliant upon entrenched sociocultural traditions of ableism.

As disabled scholars, we say this, (pain)fully acknowledging that we have, in previous publications and inadvertently, done our fair share to uphold this system ourselves, and acknowledge that we cannot claim to be free from doing so with this piece or any in the future. This issue goes beyond individual blame, it persists as a systemic cultural bias that seeps into academia which is dominated by Western positions [8]. Even as unruly parts of the system, we find ourselves complicit in holding it up, sometimes to survive it, but still often simply because we have not yet disentangled ourselves from hegemonic understandings of “doing good”. Yet, we are hurt. Our (becoming) disabled beings seem to splice our human selves.

### 2NC --- Invisibility

#### Disability is not solely a material codification but operates on invisible registers which doom its subjects to endless encounters with ableism.

**Kattari et al. 18** – Shanna K. Kattari, PhD, is an associate professor at the [University of Michigan School of Social Work](https://ssw.umich.edu/faculty/profiles/tenure-track/skattari), the Department of Women and Gender Studies, and Director of the [[Sexuality|Relationships|Gender] Research Collective](http://twitter.com/SRGCollective). Their practice and community background is as a board certified sexologist, certified sexuality educator, and social justice advocate. Dr. Kattari’s [extant research](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Uq1RjxAAAAAJ&hl=en) focuses on understanding how power, privilege and oppression systematically marginalize, exclude, and discriminate against people regarding their identities/expressions through negative attitudes, policies reinforcing oppression, oppressive actions and isolation. (Shanna K. Kattari, Miranda Olzman, Michele D. Hanna, “‘You Look Fine!’: Ableist Experiences by People With Invisible Disabilities”, Sage, Journal of Women and Social Work, 2018, pgs. 1- 4, [https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109918778073](https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0886109918778073) ) || PZ

In the literature on diversity, a significant amount of work has been undertaken on issues of racism, sexism, and more recently, heterosexism, and their corresponding privileges. However, despite discussion on disability being more than decades old, with the mainstream disability rights movement gaining momentum in the 1960s and 1970s (Wolbring, 2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act having been enacted in 1990 (United States Code, 2008), notably less academic literature has addressed ableism, particularly within the field of social work. Even disability policy as an area of focus in the literature is relatively new, given the large number of disabled individuals in the United States (Schriner, 1990). This study examines whether and how the experiences of ableism by people with invisible disabilities (someone who might not be assumed to be disabled at first meeting, such as individuals with chronic pain, traumatic brain injury, multiple sclerosis, HIV, etc.) are disparate from those whose disabilities may be more evident to others. Although members of this community use both identity-first (disabled people) and person-first (people with disabilities [PWD]) language (Dunn & Andrews, 2015), this article will focus primarily on identity-first language, as this language comes from a self-determination paradigm in line with both social work and feminist values (Ladau, 2014; National Association of Social Workers, 2017). The United States Census Bureau (2012) reported that in the 2010 Census, 21.3% of those of age 15 years and older had a disability or impairment. From these statistics, it can be inferred that approximately one fifth of U.S. residents are currently living with a disability or impairment. Disability in and of itself is a community with blurred lines—people can acquire disabilities (both short term and long term) throughout their lives, making the concept of membership to the disabled community one that is frequently difficult for other marginalized groups to understand (Davis, 1999). Although individuals with “invisible” disabilities (those that are not always, or ever, apparent to others) may not receive as much overt or explicit social stigma as those with more apparent disabilities, they are still exposed to forms of rejection, ableism, and discrimination; in fact, they may even have more trouble accessing support services than their visibly disabled counterparts due to being expected to prove their disability (Davis, 2005). Disabled individuals with invisible disabilities may struggle with “passing” as nondisabled persons in many settings (Samuels, 2003). While passing may be seen as a privilege, it can also be a challenge for these individuals to find community and be validated by disabled people. The decision on whether to pass or not comes with not only personal implications of stigma and discrimination but also more societal and political implications of outing themselves as disabled (Brune & Wilson, 2013). They may also have issues in accessing the services, support structure, and even physical spaces that they need, given assumptions about what their bodies and minds are able to do, and whether those given the power to make the distinction decide whether they are “disabled enough” (Lightman, Vick, Herd, & Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that members of this community experience ableism in different ways than those who have apparent disabilities. Ableism is the overarching act of prejudice and/or discrimination against disabled people and the devaluation of disability (Hehir, 2002) and corresponds with able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, the set of unearned privileges held by nondisabled individuals. They are both interconnected systems that maintain stratification around disability. Ableism values physical, emotional, and mental capital, following socially constructed expectations of ability (Loja, Costa, Hughes, & Menezes, 2013). Queer/disability theorist McRuer (2006) posits that like the ideal of compulsory heterosexuality, ableism results in a compulsory able-bodiedness, demanding that disabled individuals do whatever it takes to enact a nondisabled identity however possible. While sexism, racism, and other isms certainly are prevalent in all types of systems and interactions, Wolbring (2008) argues that ableism is one of the most accepted and widespread isms in society and works in conjunction with many other isms. Because of the lack of conversation around ableism and able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, prejudice against disabled people may at times be more prevalent and socially acceptable than many others types of prejudice (Ford, 2009). Although ableism is insidious and apparent in all aspects of society, little research has been conducted to understand the lived experiences of ableism by disabled individuals, nuanced disabled identities (such as those who have invisible/less obvious disabilities), and intersections of other marginalized identities with disability identities. Moreover, while there have been some publications in the field of social work around ableism, much of it focuses on policy (El-Lahib & Wehbi, 2012), sanism (discrimination around mental health) specifically (Poole et al., 2012), or the general need for better culture competency in social work practice and education regarding disabled populations (Carter, Hanes, & MacDonald, 2012; Dupre´, 2012). Disabled individuals also experience higher rates of poverty and chronic health issues than their nondisabled counterparts (Hehir, 2002; Roux et al., 2001; Storey, 2007), and there are few instances of social work around the experiences of disabled people of color, transgender disabled people, and the ways that other marginalized identities interplay with disability and ableism. Feminist disability scholars in particular have brought up the need for intersectional frameworks and connecting disability to conversations around diversity (Kafer, 2013; McRuer, 2002; Olkin, 2002). In Feminist, Queer, Crip, feminist disability studies, scholar Kafer (2013) explains that not only did feminist theory gave her the ability to critically examine notation of disability but also emphasizes the bridge between theory and practice, something incredibly relevant to the discussion of disability and ableism in social work. Microaggressions: Death by a Thousand Papercuts The concept of microaggressions is used to explain the phenomena of the implicit perpetuation of racism, sexism, heterocentrism, transphobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of power and oppression in society (Sue, 2010). Microaggressions are everyday interactions that perpetuate inequalities and stereotypes against people who belong to marginalized communities (Solo´ rzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000; Sue, 2010). They are perpetuated against many individuals holding many different identities, including race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and disability (Solo´ rzano et al., 2000; Sue, 2010). Frequent exposure to microaggressions, including ableist microaggressions, can result in higher incidence of negative mental health outcomes, feelings of being excluded, and lower positive outcomes including reduced academic performance (Khattari, 2017; Nadal, Griffin, Wong, Hamit, & Rasmus, 2014). Microaggressions are a common means of perpetuating ableism. These may include telling someone that they speak very well for a deaf person, telling someone they are lucky to get to bring their dog everywhere with them, asking a group of people to all stand for an activity (making the assumption that everyone can stand), or making a joke about how fast someone can go in their wheelchair (Storey, 2007). Many of these microaggressions are a result of assumptions about disabled people. Storey (2007) found that perpetuation of these microaggressions and assumptions result in disabled people feeling excluded or unwelcome in educational settings and produce outcomes including anger, frustration, and other feelings that can be harmful to an individual’s engagement with their community. Invisible Disabilities People with invisible disabilities or illness may be more likely to experience ableism indirectly, including through ableist microaggressions. For example, while someone might not use language like “lame” in front of someone they perceive to be mobility impaired, they may be less reticent to use such language in front of those they identify as nondisabled, whether or not those individuals actually are. Additionally, people with invisible disabilities may experience ableism when using adaptations for PWD, such as disability-designated parking spaces or elevators, when others view them as nondisabled individuals. It is possible that this is a result of unintentionally fulfilling the role of compulsory able-bodiedness suggested by McRuer (2006), simple by not having disabilities that might make themselves visibly distinct as disabled to outsiders. Disabled bodies are frequently othered and feared by society at large (Hirschmann, 2013), but there is little knowledge on how this may be experienced by those with invisible physical disabilities. Mad studies, a subset of disabilities focusing on mental health and sanism, have noted similarities in the “coming out and facing stigma/not being out and facing different marginalization” decision as faced by other individuals with sometimes invisible identities (Pilling, 2012). Therefore research is needed to help understand how disabled individuals who may not be read as disabled experience ableism in their lives. Bridging the theoretical understanding of ableism into the lived experiences of this community is a crucial move forward in creating more disability inclusive social work practice. This study explores the experiences of ableism specifically for individuals with invisible disabilities because, given that this invisibility often prevents these individual from being viewed as disabled, it is likely that their experiences may differ from disabled individuals with more apparent disabilities.

### 2NC --- Eugenics

#### That culminates in the reinforcement of the logics of eugenics that threaten genetic engineering and other developing biotech.

UN 20’. “New eugenics: UN disability expert warns against ‘ableism’ in medical practice”. United Nations Human Rights Office, 2/28/20. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/02/new-eugenics-un-disability-expert-warns-against-ableism-medical-practice

GENEVA (28 February 2020) – "**Current developments in medical research and practice may revive eugenic** **ideas if safeguards for those affected are not ensu**red," today said the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas, during the presentation of her [latest report](https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/41) to the UN Human Rights Council. The UN expert explained that **developments in gene therapy, genetic engineering and prenatal screening experienced enormous growth, increasing our power to repair the body and prevent disease, but cautioned about "eliminating" human characteristics deemed undesirable.** "People with disabilities are genuinely concerned that **these developments could result in new eugenic practices and further undermine social acceptance and solidarity towards disability** - and more broadly, towards human diversity," she said. In her report, Devandas also expressed her concerns on the impact of euthanasia and assisted suicide for persons with disabilities. "If assisted dying is made available for persons with health conditions or impairments, but who are not terminally ill, a social assumption could be made that it is better to be dead than to live with a disability," the expert warned. "People have the right to live and to die with dignity, but we cannot accept that people choose to end their lives because of social stigma, isolation or lack of access to personal assistance or disability-related services." Another major concern, Devandas stressed, is the absence of persons with disabilities in crucial debates on medical research and practice. "Without their experiences directly informing those debates, narratives suggesting that living with disabilities should be prevented become reinforced and socially validated."The Special Rapporteur explained that **"ableism" is at the root of the problem. "If the life experiences of people with disabilities continue to be undervalued, no progress will be made." "What we need is a profound cultural transformation on the way society relates to the difference.** That is a commitment to embrace disability as a positive aspect of human diversity. States must combat all forms of discrimination based on disability," the human rights expert concluded. Devandas also reported back to the Human Rights Council on her visits to [Kuwait](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/41/Add.1), [Canada](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/41/Add.2) and [Norway](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/43/41/Add.3). ENDS Ms Catalina Devandas (Costa Rica) was designated as the first [Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disability/SRDisabilities/Pages/SRDisabilitiesIndex.aspx) in June 2014 by the UN Human Rights Council. She has worked extensively on the rights of persons with disabilities and inclusive development for the past 20 years, including with the World Bank, the United Nations, and international donor organizations. Her work priorities include socioeconomic inclusion, the promotion of full citizenship of persons with disabilities, and embracing diversity/understanding that persons with disabilities are part of human diversity. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the [Special Procedures](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx) of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organisation and serve in their individual capacity.

## Alt

### 2NC --- Discrit

#### The alternative is an embracement the a framework of Discrit to rupture the line between ability and disability. Understanding race and disability on both a marco and micro scale is key to disrupt normative conceptions of ability.

Annamma et al 2012 (Annamma, Subini Ancy ; Connor, David ; Ferri, Beth. “Dis/Ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/Ability.” Race, Ethnicity and Education, vol. 16, no. 1, 30 Oct 2012, United Kingdom: Routledge, pp. 1–31, doi:10.1080/13613324.2012.730511.) // RB

Rationale for DisCrit Scholars outside Dis/ability studies might see an article about dis/ability and think, ‘This is a special education issue so I do not have to concern myself.’ However, we believe that issues of perceived dis/ability constitute issues of equity that involve all people. Like Du Bois before them, many critical scholars outside the field of special education have recognized that the social construction of dis/ability depends heavily on race and can result in marginalization, particularly for people of color and those from non-dominant communities (Gutiérrez and Stone 1997; McDermott, Goldman, and Varenne 2006; Oakes 1995; Rubin and Noguera 2004). Given the racial gap in graduation, incidents of discipline, and incarceration rates, along with vast over-representation of students of color in special education and the lackluster achievement rates within many of these special education programs, we must critically examine why so many students labeled with a dis/ability, particularly students of color, are either experiencing failure or being perceived as failing and on what grounds.

We introduce DisCrit as an exploratory conversation wherein we ask, ‘How might DisCrit further expand our knowledge (or understanding) of race and dis/ability?’ We seek to add important dimensions to CRT analysis by considering the ways race and dis/ability are co-constructed. Our goal is not to replace or replicate CRT, but to recognize what it both enables and constrains and then propose the necessity of considering ability within the framework. Indeed, we are indebted to CRT, LatCrit and Fem-Crit (as well as Feminist Legal Studies), along with Dis/abilities Studies theorists, for laying the groundwork and stimulating our thinking in this endeavor (Bell 1987; Berry 2010; Brantlinger, 1997; Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado Bernal 2002; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Erevelles et al. 2006; Ladson-Billings and Tate 1995; MacKinnon 1998/2011; Reid and Valle 2004; Solórzano and Bernal 2001; Solórzano and Yosso 2001). We draw on many of these works, not to co-opt them, but rather to illustrate points of connection between and among dis/ability and the various social locations theorized by these scholars with the intent to further develop theory that will be of service in understanding the lived realities of people. DisCrit is an attempt to recognize a confluence between fields that are profoundly connected but are, for various reasons, often unable or unwilling to engage in joint thinking and efforts to solve issues faced by people of color. The aim of DisCrit is to push DS and CRT to academically and practically bridge commonalities utilizing the tensions between the theories as places for growth instead of resistance and separation. Ultimately we want to extend CRT and DS in ways that are useful and thoughtful to better understand how concepts of race and ability are intertwined. We believe, for instance, that racism and ableism are normalizing processes that are interconnected and collusive. In other words, racism and ableism often work in ways that are unspoken, yet racism validates and reinforces ableism, and ableism validates and reinforces racism. For students of color, race does not exist outside of ability and ability does not exist outside of race; each is being built upon the perception of the other (Crenshaw 1993). However, because racism and ableism are ‘so enmeshed in the fabric of our social order, [they] appear both normal and natural to people in this culture’ (Delgado and Stefancic 2001, 21). Our goals, then, align with Delgado and Stefancic’s (2001) desire to unmask and expose the normalizing processes of racism and ableism as they circulate in society.

A DisCrit theory in education is a framework that theorizes about the ways in which race, racism, dis/ability and ableism are built into the interactions, procedures, discourses, and institutions of education, which affect students of color with dis/abilities qualitatively differently than white students with dis/abilities (Crenshaw 1993; Solórzano and Yosso 2001).3 The qualitatively different experiences of students of color labeled with the same dis/ability in comparison to white peers in education settings is illustrative. For example, students of color tend to be educated in settings segregated from the general population more often than their white peers with the same dis/ability label who were more likely to receive support in the general education classroom and learn alongside their general education peers (Fierros and Conroy 2002). In other words, dis/ability status justifies segregation and unequal treatment for students of color compared to their white counterparts. Additionally, African American students are ‘67% more likely than white students with emotional and behavioral problems to be removed from school on the grounds of dangerousness and 13 times more likely than white students with emotional and behavioral problems to be arrested in school’ (Meiners 2007, 38). Dis/ability status works somewhat differently within higher education. For example, although there has been an increase in students with Learning Dis/abilities (LD) entering college, the majority of students are white and from families whose annual income exceeded $100,000 (Reid and Knight 2006); signaling that being white and possessing economic means allows a student with LD to gain access to higher education. The experiences of students of color with dis/abilities, such as where they are educated, with whom they are educated, and their access to college, tend to be qualitatively different than the experiences of their white peers with the same label (Blackorby and Wagner 1996). The role of the liberal, white middles class in maintaining structures and practices of privilege within education has been documented by Brantlinger in her study of social class and race interlock (2003). Using DisCrit, we seek to address the structural power of ableism and racism by recognizing the historical, social, political and economic interests of limiting access to educational equity to students of color with dis/abilities on both macro and microlevels (Connor 2008a). We recognize that ability and dis/ability are perceived and created based on ideologies of race and located within social and institutional structures as well as personal attitudes. As Collins (1990) notes: First, the notion of interlocking oppressions refers to the macrolevel connections linking systems of oppression such as race, class, and gender. This is the model describing the social structures that create social positions. Second, the notion of intersectionality describes microlevel processes-namely, how each individual and group occupies a social position within interlocking structures of oppression described by the metaphor of intersectionality. Together they shape oppression. (492).

DisCrit seeks to understand ways that macrolevel issues of racism and ableism, among other structural discriminatory processes, are enacted in the day-to-day lives of students of color with dis/abilities. Additionally, we find Crenshaw’s (1993) work on intersectionality useful for theorizing the ways in which race and ability are likewise intertwined in terms of identity. Similar to Crenshaw’s articulation of race and gender, students of color labeled with a dis/ability likewise ‘have no discourse responsive to their specific position in the social landscape; instead they are constantly forced to divide loyalties as social conflict is presented as a choice between grounds of identity’ (Crenshaw et al. 1995, 354). Although Crenshaw does not speak directly to dis/ability, Watts and Erevelles (2004) contend that students of color labeled as disabled, like women of color or gay and lesbian people of color, must also choose where to stand in social conflicts with groups that do not fully share their identities. Moreover, in terms of dis/ability identity, dis/abled students are often positioned such that they are likely (and even encouraged) to reject identifying as disabled as something that is inherently negative or shameful (Connor 2008a) rather than a potentially politicized identity or critical consciousness (Peterson 2009; Shakespeare 1996). The consequences of simply being labeled as disabled, even if one does not claim that identity, can result in rejection from cultural, racial, ethnic and gender groups (Goodwin 2003). Moreover, unlike race and ethnicity, individuals who are disabled, like individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) typically do not share this social status with their immediate family members (Morris 1991; Shakespeare 1996). DisCrit draws on insights from Dis/ability Studies to provide a discourse responsive to the social positioning of students of color with a dis/ability, reframing dis/ability from its subordinate position to a positive marker of identity and something to be ‘claimed’ (Caldwell 2011; Linton 1998b). The ways in which over-representation of students of color in special education currently work, reinforces the racial hierarchies the US subscribes to, namely: (1) the under-representation of Asian Americans, which problematically allows them to be seen as a homogenized ‘model’ minority (Lee 2009); (2) the exclusion of Native Americans in almost all research and continues to emphasize their invisibility in education and larger societal discourse even though they are vastly over-represented in many categories of special education, particularly in states with large numbers of Native American students (Brayboy 2006; Fierros and Conroy 2002); (3) the overrepresentation of Latinos/Latinas in some regions of the country where their population is high and the ways those who speak a second language ntersects with notion of ability. Additionally, emerging bilinguals are more likely to be over-represented in middle and high school and this timing may coincide when they are exited or graduated from segregated ESL or bilingual programs (Artiles et al. 2005); and (4) and the continual over-representation of African Americans across the US, regardless of social class, positions them as the continual problem in American education (Erevelles et al. 2006). Each of these trends in over-representation must be examined in relation to race and ability. In this case, an additional consideration would include gender, given that most of these statistics represent males; at the same time, females of color are also disproportionately represented in disciplinary actions, special education and the juvenile justice system compared to their white female peers (The American Bar Association and National Bar Association 2001; Losen and Skiba 2010; Mendez and Knoff 2003; Oswald, Coutinho, and Best 2002).

As we frame our discussion of DisCrit, we draw on research that relies on the statistical categories of ability and race because these categories result in socially constructed inequities, not because we believe they are necessarily biological realities. This is essential to state explicitly as we do not want to impose identity categories upon any one individual or group of people. Instead, we seek to highlight how the process of structural racism externally imposes identities on individuals by applying socially constructed labels. We also hope to illustrate how specific consequences are associated with labeling. We therefore acknowledge that while ability and racial categories are socially constructed, they continue to have real material outcomes in terms of lived experiences. DisCrit problematizes the ways that binaries between normal/abnormal and abled/disabled play out in a range of contexts. From the physical layout of K-12 schools, where special education is often relegated to separate hallways or even buildings removed from the rest of the students, to universities where departments of Special Education are often detached from Curriculum and Instruction in schools of education (Young 2011). Thus, in symbolic and material ways dis/ability occupies quarantined spaces (Foucault 1977: Graham and Slee 2007). Similar lines are drawn in such diverse contexts as film and media, to publications on dis/ability, to sports and recreation.4 Where particular kinds of texts get published and circulated is another salient example of this line between able/disabled. For example, articles that focus upon the over-representation of students of color are often published in special education journals, whereas articles that are perceived as general education topics are published in journals that are specific to general education. Thus, rarely do these topics of race and dis/ability intersect. When those of us in special education attempt to write for a ‘general education’ journal audience, editors respond that we must give explicit explanations for why our work should be read by those who do not work within the field of special education. This professionally enforced line between special education and general education journals sustains and encourages the compartmentalization of these two artificially separated domains instead of seeing sharing the same field of education. Furthermore, the separation of research reifies the differences between ability and disability, emphasizing divisions among educators and the students we serve. We see this general–special dividing line being drawn in K-12 schools, teacher education programs, teacher certification, education research, and society at large. It is a line that is focused upon what children with dis/abilities cannot do, instead of emphasizing what their strengths are and what unique abilities they possess. It also reifies some students as ‘regular’ or normative and others as so different that their instruction should be left to specialists. DisCrit questions how this line is drawn, how it has changed over time for a variety of types of dis/abilities, who has the control over this line, and what effects the line produces in education and in society? In other words, DisCrit recognizes the shifting boundary between normal and abnormal, between ability and disability, and seeks to question ways in which race contributes to one being positioned on either side of the line. Like whiteness as a social construct or the phenomenon of differential racialization, which both expand and contract racial categories to include and exclude different people in order to limit and extend benefits of being labeled as such, ability and disability changes throughout history in similar ways and are deeply impacted by perceptions of race (Banks 2002; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Leonardo 2007). In order to understand this phenomenological ‘line,’ it will be necessary to examine ways in which differential minority groups have become racialized in various regions of the country throughout different periods of time – and how beliefs about of dis/ability affect those occurrences. Encountering the social construction of dis/ability, many people pose the question, ‘Are you arguing that there are no physical or mental differences in abilities?’ In response, we would acknowledge that there are, of course, corporeal differences among humans though those differences are rarely, if ever, as fixed and obvious as generally assumed. However, we are most interested in human responses to those differences we currently call dis/abilities.5 We do not see the benefit of drawing what is inevitably an arbitrary (and unstable) line, where certain differences are not perceived as part of normal human variation, but rather become a ‘thing’ so different that we must call them disabled. Moreover, the very notion of difference relies on something else being normative. We are all different from one another. In other words, a person who is perceived as having a dis/ability is no more or less different from someone who is considered nondisabled than that nondisabled person is different from him/her. Yet, the person with the dis/ability is perceived as the one who is inherently different. However, there can be no difference without a norm, upon which difference is measured. We agree, therefore, with Baglieri and Knopf (2004) who state, ‘The question is not whether we perceive differences among people, but, rather, what meaning is brought to bear on those perceived differences’ (525, emphasis added). In the remaining portion of this article we put some of these ideas into specific tenets and then elaborate on each tenet. We do so not to be prescriptive, but rather to try to operationalize what kinds of specific questions and issues can be illuminated from a DisCrit approach.

### 2NC --- Global resistance

#### The alternative can make material change through a global resistance movement against ableist structures.

McRuer 18(McRuer, Robert. Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance.” NYU Press, 2018. JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1pwt9nj>. Accessed 14 Jul. 2022. ) //RB

This chapter examines disability in relation to a keyword drawn from the subtitle to this book: resistance. In this section, I consider how crip/ queer theorists have attended to the theoretical vicissitudes of this keyword; I position their theorizing as itself a tactic of resistance. Resistance has arguably had an uneven history of late in critical cultural theory, perhaps especially in queer theory. For a time, a certain foundational strand of queer theory indebted to the work of philosopher Michel Foucault has emphasized a theory of necessary or inevitable resistance. “Where there is power, there is resistance,” Foucault famously wrote. “And it is doubtless the strategic codification of those points of resistance that makes a revolution possible” (History 95, 96). As something called queer theory was congealing in the 1990s, David Halperin, in his book Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, was a key figure spelling out what Foucauldian (queer) resistance could mean. Detailing in particular the ways in which Foucault’s work makes possible an understanding of power not as always and everywhere repressive but as productive, Halperin insisted that “the aim of an oppositional politics is . . . not liberation but resistance” (18). For Foucault, in Halperin’s interpretation, dreams of “liberation” from “repression” posited or imagined spaces outside power and could not really grasp the insidious ways in which the very languages to which we are subjected (languages of “sexuality,” for example) materialize and secure specific ways of being and knowing and block inventiveness and creativity. “Does the expression ‘let us liberate our sexuality’ have a meaning?” Foucault asks. “Isn’t the problem rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could determine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relationships with others?” (qtd. in Halperin 193– 194). The queer sociality that is Floyd’s topic would, in this understanding, not seek somehow to liberate an underlying essence or truth; it would, rather, inventively generate new (and resistant) forms of pleasure and relationality.

A focus on practices of freedom that generate inventive new forms of intimacy and indeed, “life” has likewise characterized disability studies work on resistance. The most foundational work in this vein, such as the essays collected in Shelley Tremain’s important edited collection Foucault and the Government of Disability, often pinpoints the ways in which the supposed “truth” of disabled lives is constituted diagnostically through the workings of what Foucault terms juridical power. Fixed with a diagnosis, disabled subjects are then reductively understood through, and always and everywhere made to speak the truth of, their pathology: this pathology and only this pathology, juridical power might say, is what disability looks like. Again, however, even as various forms of authority, especially medical authority, appear to be always and only negative or repressive, such encounters necessarily generate excessive subjects speaking otherwise. Tremain writes that “individuals and juridically constituted groups of individuals have responded to subjecting practices, which are connected in increasingly intimate and immediate ways to ‘life,’ by formulating needs and imperatives of that same ‘life’ as the basis for political counterdemands, that is, by turning them around into focuses of resistance” (7, emphasis in the original). Resistant practices of freedom echo across, or are made imperative in, virtually all the most famous slogans of disability movements globally. If juridically constituted groups of disabled individuals are objectified by medical authority, pitied by nondisabled others in and through that objectification, and perhaps even encouraged and assisted (in increasing numbers of locations) to end their own lives, those constituted as such respond collectively with assertions like “nothing about us without us,” “piss on pity,” and “assisted living, not assisted dying.” “This is what disability looks like” is here put forward as a resistant counterdemand, unfixing what would appear to be (in Tremain’s words) “that same ‘life.’

The urgency of such counterdemands, particularly as they individually and collectively reanimate those subjectified as disabled, underscores Halperin’s point that “such radicalism is not merely a radicalism for its own sake, a fashionable attachment to whatever may look new in the way of personal and political styles” (66). Nonetheless, as queer theory in particular has flourished in the two decades since Saint Foucault, achieving in the process a legible cachet and marketability in the academy and in academic publishing (which arguably thrives on that which “looks new” in relation to a range of intellectual and political styles), a certain congealing of resistance, that perhaps could be described as “radicalism for its own sake,” is evident. A well- intentioned critique of the mainstream lgbt movement’s incorporation into state and capital has as its flip side a longing for a somewhat innocent figure of “resistance.” In his study Under Bright Lights: Gay Manila and the Global Scene, Bobby Benedicto traces both sides of this conundrum in queer theory: Indeed, much of the work on what might be termed queer complicities has focused on how gay white men (or conflated figures of gayness and whiteness) are implicated in practices of exclusion and embedded in market capitalism. This is an important focus but I am wary of how it leads, directly or indirectly, to the conjuration of a list of abstracted, othered figures: the queer of color, the third- world queer, the disabled queer, the working- class queer, and the like that are invested with the potential for transgression by virtue of their exclusion and on whom faith is placed for a still radical politics. (13– 14, emphasis in the original) Benedicto’s important project thus attempts to pull back from abstraction, particularly removing the “third- world queer” (a figure based in the Philippines, in Benedicto’s anthropological study, but a figure who imagines himself as a citizen of a global gay network) from a space of innocence: “the third- world queer is not just the other but an other that makes his own others: ‘He’ is at the center of the city and at the margins of the world” (14). “His own others,” in the Manila of Under Bright Lights, are often haunting, disabled figures, “as when gay men drive around at night to head to the clubs, but are suddenly caught in standstill traffic and come face- to- face with the vagrants on the road: the old blind men and women with their plastic cups stretched out and their walking sticks tapping lightly on the wheels” (11). This passage, of course, arguably participates in exactly what it is critiquing, as blind men and women are objectified, made into others, through Benedicto’s staging of the scene; the very syntax of the passage performs what it purports to describe, as the colon points toward vagrants made into objects. Still, Benedicto’s larger point remains: if any queer theoretical location has invoked or produced the third- world queer as the figure “on whom faith is placed for a still radical politics,” such claims should always be subjected to scrutiny. Under Bright Lights, at its best, disallows any innocent investment in the third- world queer, and by extension any innocent investment in other abstracted figures.

Resistance as it has congealed in some queer theoretical texts, for Benedicto is thus not necessarily something to aim for: “I want to suspend the academic desire to spot difference and resistance, and to acknowledge that local agency also works in the service of modernist aspirations, that it can be mobilized to reproduce the center in the margins, is constrained by the force of material environments, and remains animated by narratives of progress and modernity” (17). It’s worth pointing out, however, that simply spotting difference and resistance is already a compromise of Foucauldian resistance, as Halperin’s study makes clear. That is because spotting, identifying, and putting faith in a figure endows that figure with a substance or essence that is untrue to the ways power works in a Foucauldian sense. Spotting difference and resistance suggests that there is nothing left to do once it is found; it can, essentially, only be admired. Foucault himself, however, consistently turned away from the fantasy of simply spotting or naming that which was supposedly or inherently good (and, of course, thereby liberatory) or bad. In a famous quotation that would become Tremain’s epigraph for Foucault and the Government of Disability, he insists, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do” (“Geneaology” 256; qtd. in Tremain front matter). In Foucault’s sense, since identifying/spotting the third- world queer would always be dangerous, acknowledging, as Benedicto does, “that local agency also works in the service of modernist aspirations,” is actually itself a resistant act. Moreover, writing a thorough anthropological study of how that complicit agency functions (including how it might function in relation to haunting crip figures who emerge in the margins of the text) is part of the “something to do” that always remains. This is not at all to undercut Benedicto’s aim of suspending the academic desire to spot difference and resistance; it is to point out that where that academic desire has conjured up innocent others over the past few decades it is not actually resistant in the ways that concept has been theorized by some commentators on Foucault such as Halperin or Tremain.

Nirmala Erevelles, like Benedicto, is cautious about the ways in which resistance in academic writing can become a mesmerizing but ineffective “transgression”: “Poststructuralism’s deconstructive potential along with its limitless possibilities for (re)imagining the transgressive body makes for seductive scholarship— a point not lost on disability studies scholars who have done radical work in retheorizing disability outside the constricting limits of dominant discourse” (12). Erevelles’s Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a Transformative Body Politic, however, sustains a deep commitment to collective resistance: “At the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability, we will find that collective resistance is more fruitful than individualized forms of resistance” (120). Disability and Difference in Global Contexts is one of the defining texts in what might be understood as a “global turn” in disability studies; it is now indispensable for theorizing intersectionality in the field. As the subtitle suggests, “transformation” is prioritized by Erevelles over a ludic “transgression.” The book also furthers urgent conversations that remain underdeveloped in disability studies, considering in particular the ways in which disability is often caused by the devastations of capitalism, imperialism, and war. Throughout Disability and Difference in Global Contexts, Erevelles reaches for what she terms “a common platform of resistance” (130), and rightfully critiques theorists, including transnational feminist theorists, who do not or cannot incorporate a materialist analysis of disability into their work. Erevelles calls for a disability studies that consistently theorizes disability in relational, transnational contexts; her call particularly resonates for me, writing in and about a period when a compulsory common sense about austerity has been imposed (often forcefully) globally. As should be clear throughout Crip Times, I share both Erevelles’s critique of hegemonic forms of capitalist globalization and her sense that collective resistance remains urgent. I also agree with the implication that a poststructuralist theory imagining what she terms “limitless possibilities” would not be particularly resistant. Such a theory would also, however, not be particularly poststructuralist, as a rigorous poststructuralist attention to the instabilities of signification should certainly not translate into a world of limitless possibility but rather a world where the intertwined discursive and material construction of limits should be continually interrogated. In a slightly different context, Sara Ahmed reminds us that “the poststructuralist critique of language was that words are far from trustworthy . . . the poststructuralist turn begins with a suspicion of words as much as things” (34); the necessary suspicion Ahmed writes about is completely lost if poststructuralism is resignified (or fixed) as agentic, individualistic, and limitless.2 Erevelles’s characterization of poststructuralism as encouraging limitless possibility would essentially, in Judith Butler’s terms, “restore a figure of a choosing subject,” and ignore the ways in which the poststructuralist theory Erevelles derides actually encourages “collective disidentifications [which] can facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern” (Butler, Bodies x, 4). There is a difference between poststructuralist theory more generally and an academic marketplace which can indeed encourage writing that simply spots difference and transgression. The existence of that academic marketplace (about which both Benedicto and Erevelles are rightly wary) should not obscure the fact that there is far more common ground than her study acknowledges between a critical attention to textuality, discourse, and the slipperiness of signification and the Marxist materialism and collective resistance that Disability and Difference in Global Contexts puts forward.3

Arguing that “we shall need a literary imagination” to supplement conventional forms of political resistance or revolution, Darieck Scott advances, in Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination, a reading of bodily and mental distress in the work of Frantz Fanon that both affirms the need for “a reservoir of resistance to the colonizer’s acts of subjugation and enslavement” and attempts to account for what is lost when the complex workings of language and textuality are discounted (94, 65). Scott’s analysis is not explicitly crip, and yet his attention to wounded bodies and minds (the bodies and minds Fanon tended during the Algerian revolution) has much to offer disability studies, especially in relation to resistance. Surveying the ways in which Fanon writes about his patients, Scott particularly attends to the ongoing metaphor of muscular tension. Fanon examines bodies that have been beaten down and broken by colonization and war and sees in those disabled bodies both the need for an active and ongoing resistance to colonization and the potential for that active resistance. Wounded, tense muscles, in Scott’s reading of Fanon, are indicative and anticipatory: they indicate what colonialism and war have done and anticipate an active resistance, by those same bodies, to colonial domination. Fanon can in some ways be aligned with Erevelles here, since— as I have indicated— she too focuses, more than fifty years later, on how disability is often caused by colonialism and capitalism. Like Fanon, moreover, Erevelles looks beyond language and textuality toward forms of active resistance that would counter those systems. Scott, however, while consistently acknowledging that “the need to continue this pursuit [of active resistance] is clear” (9), lingers over the language of abjection, blackness, and woundedness, discovering within it other forms of resistance. Paradoxically, Scott reanimates resistance in and through abjection. If Fanon moves quickly from literal and metaphorical broken bodies and tensed muscles to “the robust selfendorsement” that is ultimately a form of Black Power (9), Scott examines what is lost in a too hasty dismissal of the conviviality, in language, of abjection, blackness, and woundedness. Although it is not at all his intent, Scott excavates an ableism that is inherent to Fanon’s theory and by extension any theory that would conjure away the twisted contours of the literary imagination. Fanon’s postcolonial subject cannot locate value in woundedness and brokenness; resistance only emerges when that subject overcomes his linguistic relegation to abjection, blackness, and disability. Scott, however, pinpoints another form of resistance that is always in circulation around the resistance, power, and consciousness Fanon puts forward. The “fading scars,” to turn toward the title of O’Toole’s memoir, remain scars for Scott. O’Toole’s memoir might be understood as performing, in a different vein, what Scott theorizes, although she more explicitly combines Scott’s literary imagination with the (disability) materialism of Erevelles. O’Toole writes, “My scars define me. I have often wanted to host a Scar Camp where I can celebrate and mourn my scars with other disabled people, where being scarred is the norm. . . . Where we sing and paint and write and perform our scar stories. . . . Scars remind me that the traumas of my past will always accompany me, faded though they may be” (46– 47). Scott would likely argue that “Fanon does not value this form of resistance except as the sketchy lineaments of a figure yet to be fully realized.” Yet this scarred, wounded figure— a figure that is literally disabled but never named as such by Scott— “possesses an intriguing quality: defeated, working within and saturated by the defeat that constitutes its foundation and the limits of its effectiveness, yet not defeated, in such a way that it exceeds the defeat and takes on a powerfulness that the defeat does not quash or necessarily succeed in assimilating” (70– 71). Scott uses the phrase “extravagant abjection” to describe the resistance that is legible in brokenness, wounds, and scars (10). In the remainder of this chapter, I carry Scott’s (and O’Toole’s) theory of resistance to a selection of locations, articulating extravagant abjection to crip tactics that are pushing back against austerity.

Austerity arguably generates extravagant abjection, literally wounding bodies and minds and then metaphorically redoubling that woundedness by pointing to the faded scars and insisting that they merit austerity, as they have no value and supposedly generate no value. Crip/queer theorizing of resistance, I have implied here, is itself a crip tactic that opposes both such austere ways of thinking and austerity as an economic policy. In the rest of this chapter, turning toward what I identify as an excessive crip sociality in the United States, Chile, Spain, Greece, and the UK, I note the ways in which subjects in those locations collectively linger over scars, woundedness, and disability. In Scott’s sense, they take on a powerfulness that defeat does not quash or necessarily succeed in assimilating. The deconstructive potential of language and a desire to find value in abjection are at work in each of the remaining tactics in this chapter, alongside or in and through the more recognizable or legible, active collective resistance that is needed to counter austerity.

### 2NC --- Schizz

#### Let’s schizz this shit up! The process of schizzing is a commitment to the quality of sociality toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures. We’ll term this schizoeconomics. The schizz cuts subjectivity as we know it liberating the neurodiverse from the grips of capitalism.

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by [Duke University Press - For a Pragmatics of the Useless (dukeupress.edu)](https://www.dukeupress.edu/for-a-pragmatics-of-the-useless) accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Schizoanalysis is an alter-economic practice: its work is to unmoor the financialization of the individual as metric of preexisting value. The schizz cuts through the middle, neurodiverse in its call for the more-than. “No more normopaths!” it howls. How-else-with-and? The schizz of the schizoanalytic practice must never be reindividualized by setting up the figure of the lone schizophrenic, or any figure, as its cipher. Contrary to some interpretations of Anti-Oedipus, nowhere do Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari idealize psychosis or schizophrenia. As everywhere in their philosophy, the aim is not to moralize but to couple the pragmatic with the speculative, asking how processes unfold and what immanent valuations run through them. The differentiation they make between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as entity is vital in this regard. The schizophrenic entity “can only be defined in relation to the arrests, the continuations in the void, or the finalist illusions that repression imposes on the process itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). The schizophrenic process, or what they call the schizoid pole, refers to the manner in which desire invests itself in sociality. At the schizoid pole, knowledge schizophrenizes, passing beyond its own axiomatics, creating new operations. “Figureschizzes” are produced “that are no longer either figurative or structured” (371). These two operations, the schizophrenic entity and the schizophrenic process, are in continuous co-composition, the schizoid pole always also in proximity with the threat of the pathological. Desire schizzes, uncoupling pathology Cephalopod Dreams Finance at the Limit 8 290 Chapter 8 from process. Desire, the impersonal force that activates socialities in germ, is the revolutionary activity through which new lifeways are produced, schizzing all the while. What distinguishes the schizophrenic from the neurotic is psychosis. What is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is that psychosis cannot be oedipalized. The neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary . . . is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such apolitics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: orphans (no daddymommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi) The schizz must always be considered in terms of what it can do, not in terms of what it defines. It is from this vantage point that the figure of the schizophrenic must be understood in the account of capitalism and schizophrenia, with Oedipus always as the overdetermining pull to the neurotic replaying, in all pathologies, of what holds them to the narration of a preexisting structure. Oedipus should not be considered an actual formation, however. The Oedipus complex is a tendency in potentia: “it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 129). Psychosis schizzes Oedipus. This is why Freud disliked schizophrenics: “For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 23).1 In schizzing the “neurotic territoriality of Oedipus,” psychosis produces new circuits (136). There is no promise attached to these circuits. They could just as well fold back on themselves, returning to all the forms of neuroticization that reduce psychotics to the apparently unmoored, disjointed paranoid figure psychiatric institutions lock up. “Perhaps there is only one illness, neurosis, the Oedipal decay against which all the pathogenic interruptions of the process should be measured” (319). In pushing up against what can be extracted from the schizophrenic experience that resists the neuroticization imposed on it, Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question that most troubled Jean Oury and was central to the work at Cephalopod Dreams 291 the La Borde clinic: “How does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering pseudo families?” (319). What techniques can be put in place to schizz the institution’s penchant for all that retriangulates? Urgently necessary is the decoupling of experience from the pathological valuations of the deficit model. As in the wider field of neurodiversity, the aim is not cure but a commitment to the singular ways difference expresses itself and the qualities of desire, knowledge, and creation it produces. “A true politics of psychiatry, or antipsychiatry, would consist therefore in the following praxis: (1) undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness; (2) liberating the schizoid movement of deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound tendency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 321). Against normopathy, schizoanalysis never does its work from outside the event. Sensitive to the schizz, it moves with it, following its tendencies. “Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness (‘great tepid aquariums’), but on the contrary because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along” (321). From this vantage point, schizophrenia shifts from entity to force, desiringproduction its motor. “Like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines” (5). There is no longer “a specific, identifiable schizophrenic entity” (6). What there is instead is a practice of the schizz that attunes to the multiplicity of “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself” (15). Multiplicity in differential, the schizoid pole explodes the great tepid aquariums of our pathological imaginations. Beyond pathology, there are no criteria. “It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (15). Is this madness? Or is the psychosis to be found in the imposed adherence of systems on worlds too differential, too multiple to tame? The schizophrenic is the limit case of existence that troubles our certainties as regards the stability of subjectivity. To repeat the mantra that drives chapter 5: “A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and 292 Chapter 8 institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our selves!” (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi).2 Schizoanalysis is not a practice of the individual. It is not a practice of pathologization, of singling out the one whose neurology will invariably be considered a deficit. Schizoanalysis is a practice of the event where I, even schizo-I, is not yet. That the schizophrenic refutes the limited envelope of the individual is certainly part of the story. But the work of schizoanalysis is not done on the body (of the schizophrenic) per se. The work is done in the relation where the phonic leaves its resonant traces. The schizz, the effect of the schizophrenizing of experience, cuts subjectivity as we know it, subjectivity as the claim to the human (the category that excludes the neurodiverse, and all qualities and forces of life-yet-tobe-invented that threaten the I as white, colonial, neurotypical being. Capitalism breaks bodies, its devaluation of qualitative difference at the level of aesthetic sociality so complete that bodies barely hold up. Exhaustion, anxiety, depression, and all their offshoots are everywhere palpable. Capitalism breeds paranoia, the ground so uneven, our bearings so unsteady, that we fold into a selfpossession that leaves no room for what exceeds us. Limited by the hardening of our edges, we become more enclosed in our-selves, less turned to an outside that would revivify the more-than that courses through us. This is what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they talk about how capitalism produces the neurotic, and, at the extreme, the “sick schizo” (1983, 362). A schizoeconomics is committed to the schizzing of capitalism. Its challenge is to work in careful attunement to capital’s own infinite appetite for circulation and deviation.3 Flows, processes, detours are, after all, what capital is made of, its movements faster, more mad, and often more creative than we would like to admit. To compose with capital is to coincide with its movements to schizz the more-than that runs through them, connecting to the speculative share of its own decidedly more-than human process. The cutting edge of capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. They run according to their own process, and sometimes run away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full human comprehension and beyond effective Cephalopod Dreams 293 human control. It is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and drive away with it. (Massumi 2017c, 9) To schizz capitalism is to develop an account of quality that can discern the difference between cuts that breed the count of assets, and cuts that revalue value. In its infinite capacity for deviation, capital is a powerful adversary. The aim of finance at the limit is always alter-capitalist, but it in no way purports that there is an outside of capital as we know it. To schizz capital is to watch another limb begin to grow elsewhere. Alter-capitalist futures will be built of more than the schizzing of capital: they will be led by the development of practices that exert the force of other ways of living in a logic that refuses the tenets that undergird capitalism—the relentless drive to quantitative increase, inexorable growth and inequality, the capture of life intensities for profit. Practicing the schizz begins there, in the midst, asking what kinds of techniques can be crafted for those other logics, logics that sidle, in approximation of proximity, an aesthetic sociality of blackness, experimenting with the minor that runs through a sociality born in the being of relation. This is to say that the practice of the schizz is never structural, never aimed at a totality, as though something as stable as capital-as-structure existed and could directly be taken down. The practice is transversal, operating in the circulation of flows themselves. This modest aim may seem useless. Indeed, it is: an ethos of the pragmatics of the useless runs through it. It claims nothing as regards grand schemes of productivity. Its proposition: to practice the art of life-living at the differential of minor socialities in a livingloving that angles toward the instauration of new modes of (merest) existence. Schizoeconomies will not come into themselves once and for all. They will always need to be (re)invented, at every turn bringing with themselves new techniques for practice unlimited. Capital is crossed by lines of escape, and this is what finance at the limit exploits. “Capitalism is continually cutting off the circulation of flows, breaking them and deferring the break, but these same flows are continually overflowing, and intersecting one another according to schizzes that turn against capitalism and slash into it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 376). Cleaving capitalism from within, the schizz produces social fields that may operate only for an instant, but nonetheless provoke the seeding of a dif­ferent mode of investment, and with it dif­ferent operations of value. Paranoia will always be around the corner, counting its coins, but as Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments 294 Chapter 8 demonstrates, minor practices of the art of life-living have always existed, even under the worst conditions: “The wild idea that animates this book is that young black women were radical thinkers who tirelessly imagined other ways to live and never failed to consider how the world might be otherwise” (2019, xv). “The revolutionary investment of desire” schizzes worlds into otherwise-living (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 378). Desiring-production is the force against which capitalism has no power: unquantifiable, in a logic of the relation of nonrelation, desire as force too impersonal to claim bends the pathways toward intensities for which no preexisting code, no count, exists. This is why the schizophrenic as conceptual persona is vital to the project of schizzing capital for Deleuze and Guattari: the schizoid pole is the pole of desiring-production and, as such, “is revolutionary, in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (1983, 379–80). Revolutionary desire is a practice, not a tool. It does its work transversally, moving waywardly where we might least expect it. Writing of Mattie, a young laundress, Hartman culls from the anarchival force of the photographs that nourish her critical fabulation the force of what desire can do in the face of racial capital’s devaluations: Mattie has been credited with nothing, deemed unfit for every role except servility, condemned in advance of wrongdoing, and destined to be a minor figure even in her own verified history. To esteem her acts, to regard rather than vilify Mattie’s restive longing, is to embrace the anarchy—the complete program of disorder, the abiding desire to change the world, the tumult, upheaval, open rebellion—attributed to wayward girls. It is to attend to other forms of social life, which cannot be reduced to transgression or to nothing at all, and which emerge in the world marked by negation, but exceed it. (2019, 62) Mobilizing the schizz, inventing schizoanalytic techniques for practices of the event, requires diligence as regards capital’s (de)valuation of existence. Techniques must be invented to learn to attune to the difference between finance unlimited (neoliberal capital) and finance at the limit (schizoeconomy), to become sensitized to what sanctions the extreme deterritorialization of capital on one end of the spectrum and empowers the infrathin registering of the ineffable on the other. Deleuze and Guattari speak of capitalism’s process of production as unleashing “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless contin- Cephalopod Dreams 295 ues to act as capitalism’s limit” (1983, 34). Capitalism is a movement that skirts the limit, continuously coming up against the dangers of crossing the threshold: “it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit” (34). This is even more clearly the case today than when Deleuze and Guattari underscored it in the late 1960s. Neoliberal capital is the flow of all flows. As Brian Massumi writes: “The ‘capitalist process’ is how the capitalist system dips into its own immanent outside to draw out new potentials for its becoming, or continuing self-constitution” (2018, 11). How to invent platforms for schizoeconomic finance at the limit that do not simply facilitate capital’s seemingly infinite capacity to capitalize on process for monetary gain? Precapitalist marginal economies may give us a clue. For their operations, unlike those of capital, are rich with emergent sociality. The notion of the penultimate is vital to understanding how limit and threshold are mobilized to engender the being of relation in these early economies. “Take two abstract groups, one of which (A) gives seeds and receives axes, while the other (B) does the opposite. What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 437). The receivability of the objects in the account above refers not to the last object received but to “the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers, or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage” (437). The seriality refers to the cycle the exchange produces. “The last as the object of a collective evaluation determines the value of the entire series. It marks the exact point at which the assemblage must reproduce itself, begin a new operation period or a new cycle, lodge itself on another territory, and beyond which the assemblage could not continue as such. This is indeed a next-to-the-last, a penultimate, since it comes before the ultimate” (438). The ultimate changes the assemblage and, with that change, produces a new series. The limit is here understood as “marking a necessary rebeginning,” while the threshold marks “an inevitable change” (438). “What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criteria and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series” (438). In the marginal economy, exchange creates the conditions for an encounter that, each time anew, establishes an emergent valuation. “There is neither exchange value nor use value but rather an evaluation of the last by both parties (a calculation of the risk involved in crossing the limit), an anticipation-evaluation that takes into account the ritual character as well as the utilitarian, the serial character as well as the exchangist” (439). The immanent limit sets the stage for “a collective feeling out” that cannot be done in advance of the event (439). Both sides are altered not 296 Chapter 8 only by the actual exchange but by their collective retuning to the limit. What has been “exchanged” is more than an object. A sociality has been invented that accompanies the object, supplementing it with the allure of the event through which it came to value. The economic cannot be reduced to the exchange itself. It is a platform for relation that facilitates a process of collective feeling-out that intuitively responds to the intensifying approach of the penultimate. Deviations in the process will cause punctual redirection, but an immanent choreography is in place to assist the process in not tipping into a new assemblage. The potency of the penultimate is the sociality it carries through the system. Consider an argument between a couple. No matter how angry they are, the couple will argue with a collective feeling-out of a limit, intuitively aware that to cross the limit might very well untether the bonds that hold the relationship together. The argument might sidle that limit, but the couple will be careful not to allow the threshold to be breached. They will do this by holding back certain thoughts, by attuning to the texture not only of what is said but how it is said, listening for what might crack their collective carapace, exposing them to what they cannot bear to hear. If they do cross that limit, everything will be up for renegotiation, and their relationship might end. The penultimate is of course never precisely knowable in advance—it is best known in retrospect from the perspective of the ultimate (after the assemblage has tipped into a new one). Attending to the penultimate means being sensitive to the field of relation in composition. Holding the process to the internal texture of its schizz is a way of attuning to the quality of a limit, collectively composing the relation in relation. When the schizz does the work of attending to the penultimate, what it does is value the pulse of duration’s serial rhythm as minor sociality. An exchange happens but it is not here that the value is located. The value is operative in the collective feeling-out that attends to the event’s composition. This can look like nothing. It can look like a simple exchange between seeds and axes. But it’s much more than that: it is the staying-with of the complexity of a seriality lived not as a transaction but as a proposition for life-living itself. Practicing the schizz toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures is a commitment to the quality of sociality highlighted in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of marginalist economies and sidelined by contemporary capitalism’s way of tending toward the limit. For capital too, as mentioned above, flirts with the limit, pulling back before it goes over the threshold. The difference is that capitalism remakes itself through quantification, in the generation of profit. What is being collectively affirmed in the marginalist economies is a mode of existence. When there is a pull back from the limit, it reflects a collective desire to remain within a field of relation. In capitalism at the limit, quantification runs wild. Cephalopod Dreams 297 When there is a push to the limit, the qualitative stakes are masked by the quantitative drive. This has devastating effects whose runoffs create a deviation of limit conditions that become capital’s new field of creative potential, the limits reset within the bounds of its own domain. This can be seen in the cyclic crises through which capitalism lurches, catching itself each time before it tips over (up to now). Schizoeconomics attunes to the quality of sociality in the collective feelingout of aneconomic fields of relation where finance at the limit revalues value.

## Framework

### 2NC --- Erasure DA

#### Erasure DA- debates about public policy and biotechnology never consider ableist struggles.

Wolbring 08 (Dr. Gregor Wolbring is a tenured Professor at the University of Calgary's Cumming School of Medicine, The Politics of Ableism, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/dev.2008.17>, 6/3/08)

The concept of ableism is everywhere and yet it is invisible within the context of science and technology policy and governance discourse. Upon searching the public domain search engine Google, Google scholar and three academic clusters of databases (Ovid Cluster of Databases, Academic Search Premier and Cambridge Scientific Databases) to ascertain the visibility of ableism within the science and technology policy academic discourse, one finds (Tables 1 and 2): ‘Ableism’ results in very few hits if combined with the terms ‘science and technology studies’, ‘policy studies’, ‘nanotechnology’, ‘biotechnology’, inequality and inequity. ‘Ableism’receives a few hits if combined with the terms ‘science and technology studies’, ‘policy studies’, ‘nanotechnology’, ‘biotechnology’, synthetic biology, inequality and inequity than if racism or sexism are combined with these terms. Ableism is invisible within the policy studies, the science and technology studies, and the nanotechnology and biotechnology discourse

### 2NC --- Ivory tower

#### Theory is a prerequisite to genuine emancipation- their ideas of activism and change miss other forms of resistance against hegemonic power.

Annamma et al 2012 (Annamma, Subini Ancy ; Connor, David ; Ferri, Beth. “Dis/Ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/Ability.” Race, Ethnicity and Education, vol. 16, no. 1, pg 17-18, 30 Oct 2012, United Kingdom: Routledge, pp. 1–31, doi:10.1080/13613324.2012.730511.) //RB

DisCrit supports activism and promotes diverse forms of resistance. Many Critical Race Theorists call for activism that links academic work to the community. This avoids sterile ideas being handed down from the ivory tower without practical application as well as ‘studying the natives’ wherein people who know nothing about the community suggest ways to fix it based on deficit perspectives (Dixson and Rousseau 2005; Stovall 2006). DisCrit acknowledges the need for activism and the reasons behind it, but recognizes that some of the activities traditionally thought of as activism (e.g. marches, sit-ins, and some forms of civil disobedience) may be based on ableist norms, which may not be accessible for those with corporeal differences. Those with admirable equity-based goals can inadvertently maintain and perpetuate inequity for other groups. In other words, to suggest that activism cannot occur from behind a desk may be missing a larger point about what it means to resist forms of domination. If theory can be violent, that is if theory can erase large portions of the population by ignoring their needs and realities, we also believe that theory can be emancipatory, offering oppressed groups a language of critique and resistance (Leonardo 2004). DisCrit supports diverse expressions of resistance that are linked to and informed by the community, whether that be academic or theoretical, pedagogical, or activist.

To summarize, each of the tenets we put forth shares the desire to reject forces, practices, and institutions that attempt to construct dis/ability based on differences from normative cultural standards. We reject attempts at the containment of people of color with dis/abilities due to their perceived divergence from normative cultural standards. Instead, we encourage society to become more encompassing of diversity and perceived difference, at the same time we question the very norms that create difference. Becoming more encompassing includes removing the policing and enforcement of normality, dissolving barriers that actively dis/able people, and focusing instead on learning from those that have historically been uniquely positioned as having what Baker (2002) terms ‘outlaw ontologies’ (663). As Matsuda (1987) plainly states, ‘Those who have experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen’ (63).

### 2NC --- Promise DA

#### Promise DA – Their model invests in the false promise of policymaking that sees its engagement as the conclusion of their project. Only DisCrit creates a place where white supremacy “can’t hide”.

**Johnson 21** - [Christopher Keith Johnson](https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher-keith-johnson-89598a4/) works for a Washington, DC-based international NGO focused on global worker rights. He resides in Johannesburg, South Africa. His work has been published in the Small Wars Journal, International Policy Digest, E-International Relations, the Journal of Black Studies, the Journal of Pan-African Studies, and Sahara Reporters. He earned his Ph.D. from Temple University, an MSc from the University of Birmingham, an M.A. from the  University at Albany, SUNY, and a B.A. from Elizabeth City State University. (Christopher Keith Johnson, “Using Disability Critical Race Theory in American Special Education Classrooms”, E-International Relations, 2 December 2021, <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/12/02/using-disability-critical-race-theory-in-american-special-education-classrooms/> ) || PZ

Definitions DisCrit builds upon the legal activism embedded within Critical Legal Studies (CLS), CRT, and DS. Its voice is as inclusive as CRT’s, with change agents approaching its strictly theoretical elements in an expansive and interdisciplinary manner. It interrogates and engages history, sexuality, gender, the whole person (body and mind), organizational development, conflict resolution, family studies, and personal and community agency. DisCrit places the disabled child in the center as a subject rather than an object of their liberation. The last element places it squarely within an African-centered approach to change that predates even CRT in the 1970s. One of CRTs founders, Kimberley Crenshaw, declares that it “is not a noun, but a verb. It cannot be confined to a static and narrow definition but is considered to be an evolving and malleable practice” (George, 2021). DisCrit is inspired and driven by the spirit of its theoretical predecessor. Raush et al. (2019) capture the definition of DisCrit as a theory and the possibilities of its application in practice: Consider the marginalization that Children of Color with dis/abilities and their families experience due to the intersection of power and privilege around race and dis/ability[…] the DisCrit framework can be used to understand how a difference in power (e.g., between administrators/teachers/schools and families) can lead to the exclusion of very young children with dis/abilities and other social identities and their families […] (Raush et al., 2019 p. 45). In America, it is dangerous to praise an unfinished project. The passage of a law, the change of a policy, and the adoption of an inclusive curriculum are often seen as the conclusion of engagement rather than its start. What DisCrit does is challenge/interrogate well-meaning law/theory/policy to agitate for action and function as a reminder of the centuries of broken promises America has made to its most vulnerable citizens and residents. With DisCrit, there is no sacred space for white supremacy to hide. Furthermore, there is no faith in a system that has proven repeatedly that it is willing to view the codification of best wishes as satisfactory for a population that should be grateful even to be acknowledged. Disability Law, Policy and Implementation Those resistant to further reform of special education in American classrooms point to the existence of disability law and well-meaning child-focused policy as positive proof that America has changed for the better in its treatment of all children with special needs. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), if applied equitably, would bring America closer to its stated aim of inclusion and protection for students with disabilities (ADA National Network, 2018). Further, the policy created by the Division for Early Childhood and the National Association for Education of Young Children, on the surface, acknowledge there are a multiplicity of innovative ways to educate children in the American classroom. However, applying the most positive standards will be limited without an interrogation of race and white supremacy. If the default from which all changes occur is whiteness, then what of those who are not white? If whiteness is the standard, then the beneficiary of these gifts would need to be white or white adjacent to be worthy of receiving anything meaningful from the system. With this in mind, education of special needs children of African descent would first be an exercise in diminishing their blackness to make them deserving of the assistance on offer. DisCrit is forced to involve itself in pushing against the othering of Black students and questioning the utility of an exercise in whitening black spaces through pacification and policing of Black bodies—students, parents, administrators, teachers—any Black body.

## Answers

### 2NC --- Governance

#### Narratives of vitality and health create the preconditions necessary for the growth of bio-political governance and the intentional debilitation of Black flesh.

**Knadler 19 -**  ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac<http://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB>) Dōgen *\*Modified for harsh language*

In Booker T. Washington’s famous 1895 Atlanta Cotton States and International Exhibition Address, he identifies that a post-Reconstruction backlash depended on the biopolitical production of a lived experience of Black health precarity and tactical debilitation. In this “compromise” speech, Washington repeatedly asserts, as most commentators note, the important role that African Americans ought to play as the laboring race in the industrial development of a New South.48 But Washington’s selling of African Americans as the “most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful” workforce that mill owners and manufacturers might hire is accompanied by an appeal as well to postemancipation myths about a disabled African American race and, in turn, to the region’s fears about biosecurity.49 As part of his “pragmatism,” it is frequently noted, Washington targets—and appeases—white self-interest, but Washington also taps into white (as well as Black) fears and anxieties about African American productive vitality. After assuring white southerners that African Americans do not seek social equality—willing to remain separate as fingers, but work as one hand in “all things essential to mutual progress”— Washington adds a thinly veiled threat that most in the audience would have hardly failed to detect: the “nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling your load upward,” Washington warns, or, switching suddenly from the synecdoche of “hands” to the first person, as if to call attention to his own embodied presence, “we shall prove a veritable body of death, stagnating, depressing, ~~retarding~~ [slowing down] every effort to advance the body politic” (222). In his language that African Americans excluded from participation in the New Southern economy will ~~“retard”~~ “[slow down]” and not advance the “body politic,” and indeed they will putrefy as a “veritable body of death,” Washington invokes a highly contentious and statistically driven public debate prompted by African America post–Civil War health inequalities: since emancipation, it was widely publicized, African Americans were a diseased, debilitated, and even, as Washington notes here, dying race in the absence of their masters’ care and protection (see chapters 1 and 2).50 But what does it mean, we need to ask, that Washington frames African American progress—the question of African American citizenship— around an opposition between Black capacity and debility? What does it mean that commentators have erased this line in their remembering of Washington’s speech and in the repeated criticism of his failure to demand immediate civil or political rights, or both? Washington’s compromise speech talks back, as we will see in chapter 1, to postemancipation debates over the contagious, disabled, and dying African American by reframing and placing these health disparities in the larger context of a post Reconstruction vitality politics. In his promotion of Black labor in the New Southern economy Washington pinpoints that postemancipation antiblackness revolved around not just the denial of rights—to work, to public access, to opportunity—but that antiblackness in the afterlife of slavery functions through the creating of cycles of debilitation and recovery that keep African Americans always on the edge of health and, thus, as the surplus laborers in racial capitalism. As Washington implies in his address, conserving the “wages of whiteness” (to borrow David Roediger’s famous phrase) means neglecting and debilitating black bodies and minds to naturalize their comparative inadequacy.51 In tracing out the diverse techniques grouped under the idea of biopower, or the way politics intervenes into the vital characteristics of biological and mental life, Michel Foucault distinguished between two general technologies: although much of Foucault’s early work focused on the production of individual discipline or the individual’s internalizing of the surveillance, control, and norms implemented in the factory, the schoolhouse, the asylum, and the prison, Foucault’s later work focused on a biopolitics that operated on the level of populations.52 As part of this biopolitics in mass, social scientists, public health officials, reformers, politicians, and race activists sought to track, survey, and regulate various demographics’ births, life expectancy, mortality, and general level of health. As Washington’s often redacted appeal to the debilitated Black body reveals, as part of the post-Reconstruction racial reordering, biopolitics broadened and shifted from tactics of direct exclusion to a dialectical regime of imposed Black debility followed by surveillance, recovery, and assistance toward optimized capacity, or what post-Reconstruction commentators called vitality, according to the demands of an industrial labor market.53 As part of U.S. national fantasies of liberal meritocracy, all citizens had to learn to monitor, assess, and “conserve” their vital resources for their personal success as well as the conservation of the race. However, a post Reconstruction politics of Black debility worked through an environmentally produced corporeal and mental enervation to render freedmen and women as a contrasting disposable population of decapacitated life incapable of achieving the aspirational promises of self-perfectibility, opportunity, economic productivity, material success, and mobility. As a result, “New ~~Negroes~~ [Blacks]” in racial uplift’s politics of respectability were not simply “policed” according to the norms of middle-class propriety.54 They were debilitated, and, as a result, the post-Reconstruction period saw a shift toward data gathering and actuarial assessments by insurance companies and public health officials that broke down the African American “citizen-patient” into an assemblage of risks, statistics, and biomedical predictions that created new networked forms of surveillance and control. Race leaders’ rehabilitative program and their invocation of a language of recovery and cure, however, sought to regulate particularly the behavior of Black women and the poor. I want to end this initial brief historical contextualization of early twentieth-century vitality politics by looking at National ~~Negro~~ [Black] Health Week, and, especially, one health week bulletin from 1927.

### 2NC --- Progress

#### Neoliberal notions of progress reconstitute themselves as Black debility becomes the antagonist of white racial progress.

**Knadler 19 -**  ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac<http://library.lol/main/D8D265377A8F7623EB4F5A75223D22AB>) Dōgen

In my original plan for this book, I had intended to say much more about the legacy of vitality politics in Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” antiobesity campaign, and to unpack its continued practice in Flint, Michigan’s lead-poisoned water crisis. While I was completing this book and meditating on the afterlife of these historical intersections of slow violence, Black debility, and fugitive justice, however, the 2016 presidential election occurred, and all seemed changed, changed utterly. I began to suspect that concluding with these stories of historical recurrence may not fully address the questions we need to ask about the long history of antiblackness and African American debility: what are the stories worth telling in our current twenty-first-century cultural moment and, as importantly, what are the questions we need to ask in telling these stories to intervene and to imagine alternative social, economic, and political possibilities? During and now after the 2016 election, as it has been frequently noted, the United States witnessed a resurgence of white nationalism (or at least its unabashed expression) and intensified antiblackness. But what interested me was how the material-semiotic sign of Black debility functioned as a key relationality within a less overt conservative white racism, which reconstituted white citizenship for a supposedly postrace multicultural America. However, this time questions of Black debility had a different valence. Although, as in an earlier post-Reconstruction period, Black debility was once again being invoked as part of a white backlash against racial progress, it had morphed. No longer was white America defining itself against a strategically constituted or permitted Black debility: it was both reappropriating this positionality as a sign of its own victimization while reauthenticating a decontextualized maiming of Black lives as a comparative sign of their inherent and implacable “noncompliant” debility. We can see this story of white America’s “rehabilitation” and the utility of Black debility most clearly in the current narratives about the opioid crisis that has caused political commentators on the right and the left to question white America’s decline and possible future, and also Black America’s intractability. In the remainder of this epilogue I will, therefore, offer a discursive reading of what I call “the gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative in public debates about white America’s needed rehabilitation in the face of the opioid crisis in order to trace out some final thoughts about Black America’s structurally necessary debility in U.S. citizenship-making stories. Then, as a way of demonstrating how this narrative has entrenched itself in Hollywood’s popular overcoming narratives, I will offer a brief analysis of the 2015 film Southpaw that, even though seemingly offering a typical sentimentalized story about cross-racial friendship in the boxing world, reveals the new logic of a white identity politics that, like the drug crisis itself, gentrifies a Black positionality and displaces its devaluation of Black life in order to circulate a dominant narrative about America’s “great (white) hope.” Specifically, in the 2015 film Southpaw, which stars Jake Gyllenhaal and is directed by the African American Antoine Fuqua, we see how the main character, Billy Hope, referred to as the boxing world’s “great white hope,” discloses how a liberal white antiracist narrative of America’s comeback story and contemporary prison reform still depend on the drug-addicted pain and suffering of an inherently different Black debility. During the 2016 presidential campaign there was a lot of talk about America’s—or at least white rural and suburban America’s—drug epidemic. As the candidates noted, citing the most recent available statistics, 37,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2013, but what captured headlines, as Vice News noted, was the fact that drug overdoses “killed white people more than anyone else,”14 or, as the New York Times reported on February, 2, 2016, “Addiction [Now] Has a White Face.”15 A study published in JAMA Psychiatry in July 2014 reported that nearly 90 percent of recent heroin users were white, and about 75 percent of these new users came from rural or suburban areas, many in states that are GOP strongholds.16 While campaigning in key primary states such as Iowa and New Hampshire, as a consequence, traditionally conservative law and order Republican candidates broke silences and confessed their own family histories with drug abuse. Jeb Bush shared his daughter’s struggle with addiction and the felony charges she had faced for “illegally possessing prescription drugs”;17 Carly Fiorina admitted her daughter’s struggle with alcohol and opiate addiction before her death from an overdose; and Ted Cruz disclosed his older half-sister Miriam’s similar overdose death, explaining, “[t]hese tragedies are happening in human lives all over this country—it’s the human journey” (emphasis added). Although not sharing personal family histories, Ohio governor John Kasich also addressed what he called (repeating the language of news stories in the New York Times as well as on NPR) the “gentrification of the drug crisis.” In 2014 Governor Kasich had passed in Ohio the first legislation to make naloxone available without a prescription because, at the time, the state had the second highest number of overdose deaths. I want for a moment to quote Governor Kasich’s comments before a Drug Addiction Forum in New Hampshire because they point out the troubling racialization, structuring antiblack debility and emergent white identity politics within various survivalist narratives about America’s drug epidemic and the push toward more humane responses, replacing incarceration with treatment. Speaking to a largely white audience in New Hampshire, a state still 96 percent white, according to the government census data, Kasich noted, “This disease knows no bounds, knows no income, knows no neighborhood; it’s everywhere. . . . And sometimes I wonder how African Americans must have felt when drugs were awash in their community and nobody watched. Now it’s in our communities, and now all of a sudden, we’ve got forums, and God bless us, but think about the struggles that other people had".19 As Kasich’s comments attest, drug addiction should be reframed as a colorblind disease, and five months later, in July 2016, Congress passed a landmark piece of legislation referred to as the Opioid Bill, or more officially as the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), that shifted low-level drug violations from the criminal justice system to treatment programs. The promotion of such a public health response represented a significant reframing and overturning of the nation’s response to addiction during the Reagan era “war on drugs,” and we should not minimize the importance of this shift toward rehabilitation. But such a therapeutic rethinking of policy also depends on a new race transcending and seemingly more civilized disability (or addiction) narrative that taps into a structuring antiblackness to rehumanize innocent white users, just as Black debility had functioned to legitimate white labor privileges and enfranchisement during the post-Reconstruction period. This “gentrification of the drug crisis narrative,” as we might call it, discloses not just a racist disparity between an earlier zero tolerance of Black crack users in the 1980s and 90s and a contemporary public health response to sympathetic white heroin users. It also offers insights more generally into an emergent dynamic of a Black debility within an unmarked white identity politics that often comes to stand in for contemporary liberal antiracist multicultural discourse. To begin to unpack how antiblackness structures the white identity politics of this seemingly more civilized “gentrification of the drug crisis” narrative, we need only look at the legacy of a long history of antiblackness and health that I have tried to recover throughout the previous chapters. As I have argued throughout this book, drawing on the work of Black Studies scholars such as Jared Sexton, Frank Wilderson, and Alexander Weheliye, antiblackness encompasses more than racial bias, discrimination, white privilege, and even violence. Antiblackness refers to a foundational structuring differentiation that continues to govern Black lives in the afterlife of slavery. Not only, thus, have white supremacists invoked antiblackness as a self-identifying racial difference, but U.S. liberal notions of personhood, citizenship, and agency have also depended on figurations of antiblackness, or of Black disposability and worthlessness and indifference to Black suffering and pain as a structuring force. In his comments before the Drug Addiction Forum, Kasich, on one hand, calls for empathy, but he also invokes the larger shaping logic of a post–civil rights white liberal identity politics (one that goes unmarked as “color-blind” amid the alarm over a more clearly vocal white supremacism): this white identity politics depends on, to borrow the language of the drug epidemic narratives, a white gentrification and appropriation of a Black positionality in the call for a universalizing empathy.20 As Kasich’s comments before the drug forum’s white audience note, whites are the new Blacks, for whites now share the suffering and pain historically associated with an abstracted Black experience, and as a consequence, the United Stated can now move beyond identity politics to embrace, as Ted Cruz indicated, a universal “human story.” But this supposed postrace, postidentity politics is its own white identity politics, one that although seemingly antiracist (built as it is around a common pain of addiction), obscures the structuring position of a differential Black debility.

### 2NC --- Tech good for disabled

#### Modern technology is unpredictable and we cannot rely on it to “solve” disability

**Schalk 18** (Sami Schalk,Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, (2018) *Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction* 105-108 http://library.lol/main/2C8F7A1D8C5F5DC42089719EDD904C24)

Through the origins of hyperempathy, Butler demonstrates how modern technology can have unpredictable effects, particularly technologies applied to human bodyminds. Such a speculative fictional representation is not far from impossible given the incredible rate of prescription drug consumption in contemporary American culture and our increasing interest in genetic testing, selection, and manipulation of embryos. The representation of hyperempathy suggests, in its critical dystopian form, that we cannot know in advance what our widespread cultural use of pharmaceutical treatments, genetic alterations, and other disability-preventing/curing technologies might have on our bodyminds in the long run, let alone on the bodyminds of future generations. Butler’s papers reveal that she planned to extend this theme in the unfinished third book in the series, often referred to as Parable of the Trickster. Drafts, notes, and outlines for this text show Butler was exploring the idea of having an Earthseed community travel to start a new colony on a planet in another solar system. When the community members arrive, people begin to experience different forms of disablement, which vary from draft to draft, including blindness, epilepsy, paralysis, and hallucinations. The idea that she continued to experiment with, based on these 106 Chapter Three drafts, outlines, and notes, was that either the technology used to keep the Earthseed community members alive on the trip, or the toxins in the air of the new habitable planet, caused these changes, and the community must learn to live with their altered bodyminds.12 Butler’s engagement with the effects of technology in the future is not simply limited to (dis)ability, but also has important material intersections with issues of race, gender, and class. When imagining a disability-free future perpetuated by technological advances that will supposedly prevent congenital disability and “fix” or “cure” all acquired disabilities, it is important to ask, who will have access to these advanced medical technologies and who will not? On whose bodyminds will new and experimental drugs and devices be tested? Who will perform the labor to extract raw materials for and construct these new technologies? Who will benefit the most and who will be barred from participation? If the history of medical experimentation such as the Tuskegee experiments or the work of Dr. Marion Sims tells us anything, people of color, women, working-class people, and people in poverty will benefit the least from technological advances and will be most at risk for harm in the development, production, and consumption of new technologies.13 In the Parable series, Butler emphasizes that technology is neither inherently liberatory nor destructive. In a journal entry dated April 23, 1999, Butler writes about this directly, stating, “Technology isn’t good or bad. It’s part of who we are, part of what we do. It’s how we us[e] it is [w]hat matters, of course” (Octavia E. Butler Papers, “oeb 1069”). Technology does not have inherent value; rather, it is how we as a culture use, misuse, and make available technologies that produces technological enhancements and/or harm. Further, the line between enhancement and harm is not always clear—nor are the two mutually exclusive. Enhancement for whom and harm to whom? What kind of enhancement and how much? What kind of harm and how much? As Butler writes, “Consequences may be beneficial or harmful. They may be too slight to matter or they may be worth the risk because the potential benefits are great, but the consequences are always there” (“A Few Rules for Predicting the Future” 166). Technology, the Parable series asserts in the face of the ideal of a technologically created, disability-free future, is an ambivalent cultural tool which is subject to both use and abuse, availability and unavailability, and a variety of unintended consequences. Hyperempathy is used as a primary example of this position on technology. As a result, Butler encourages readers to un- Bodyminds of the Future 107 derstand that one’s critical position in relation to technology need not be either purely celebratory or, in Melzer’s words, “paranoid rejection” (“And How Many Souls Do You Have?’” 177). Instead, we can evaluate particular technologies within specific contexts of creation and use. We can do so in solidarity with people with disabilities, people of color, the working class, the poor, and others who are more likely to participate in the creation and testing of such technologies while being less likely to be the beneficiaries of the results of such developments. Butler’s published and unpublished writings argue that technology guarantees neither a disability-free future nor any other supposedly desired outcome since we cannot predict its longterm effects, especially when it comes to biomedical technology. In particular, the Parable series demonstrates how marginalized groups, especially people of color and the poor, are less likely to have access to healing/curing technologies and are much more likely to be the targets of destructive technologies of violence and war. The suggestion that we cannot know in advance what our impulse toward a technologically created, disability-free future might lead to may seem problematically foreboding because it potentially suggests that the problem of disability-prevention technologies is that they might simply create more disability. However, the second way that the representation of hyperempathy resists our cultural idealization of a technologically created, disabilityfree future is through the representation of disability-related pleasure. Butler’s creation of hyperempathy insists on pleasure as an inherent aspect of the experience of this disability, a type of pleasure that nonsharers can never experience. For example, Lauren states that when having sex, “I get the guy’s good feeling and my own” (Parable of the Sower 12). During her early travels with her friends Harry and Zahra, Lauren also shares their pleasure when they have sex near her during their watch, writing, “I got caught up in their lovemaking. I couldn’t escape their sensation” (200). Later, when she meets Bankole, Lauren again discusses sharing pleasure in sex, explaining, “Best of all, he took a lot of uncomplicated pleasure in my body, and I got to share it with him. It isn’t often that I can enjoy the good side of my hyperempathy. I let the sensation take over, intense and wild” (266). While these moments of Lauren’s shared pleasure are few in comparison to the many representations of shared pain, they are incredibly important to Butler’s representation of disability in the future. The representation of disability-related pleasure in the Parable series shifts the ableist ways in which our culture typically understands disabled bodyminds as both nonsexual and as always more difficult and limiting than nondisabled bodyminds. Importantly, Butler does this without making Lauren come across as magical or as the perpetually overcoming, superpowered supercrip.14

### 2NC --- You’re not disabled

#### Disidentification with disability and crip allow the mintrotain subject to refuse either fully conform or fully resist to dominate structurces

Schalk 13 (Sami Schalk, Department of Gender Studies, Indiana University, Vol. 33 No. 2 (2013): Self-reflection as scholarly praxis ,Disability Studies Quarterly (DSQ), “Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification with/in Disability Studies” https://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3705/3240 ) // RB

As a young gender, race, and disability studies scholar, my entry into and relationship with/in this last field of study is not the story many expect when I tell them that I do disability studies. Unlike many people in the field, I am not (yet) a person with a disability and I am not (yet) the parent, guardian, sibling, or partner of a person with a disability. Ten to 15 years ago, being a nondisabled 1 disability studies researcher 2 with no immediate, personal experience with disability would have been relatively unusual. However, due to the growth of disability studies as an academic field since the 1990s, more people are encountering disability theory in the course of their academic careers whether or not they identify as or have a personal relationship with a person with a disability. Although I do not identify as a person with a disability, I nonetheless have come to identify with the term "crip" as elucidated by feminist and queer crip/disability theorists such as Carrie Sandahl, Robert McRuer, and Alison Kafer. As a fat, black, queer woman, my experiences have led me to have particular personal and political connections to the term "crip" and a disidentified relationship with disability studies. In what follows, I argue that disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects to disidentify with other minoritarian subjects, communities, and/or representations and that this kind of disidentifying process among/across/between minoritarian subjects can allow for coalitional theory and political solidarity.

By coalitional theory, I mean theories which are inclusive of multiple minority groups without being limited to only those people who occupy multiply minoritized positions. Regarding political solidarity, I follow Chandra Talpade Mohanty who defines solidarity as follows:

In terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities…who have chosen to work and fight together. Diversity and difference are central values here—to be acknowledged and respected, not erased in the building of alliances (2003, p. 7).

My goal here is to show through both my own experiences and existing theory how disidentification with/in disability studies and identification with crip offers transformative possibilities for disability studies to make stronger academic and political connections to other identity-based fields, particularly race/ethnic and sexuality/queer studies—connections that the field has not yet been able to make thus far in substantive and lasting ways.

As an undergraduate first coming into my feminist voice, I began to embrace my many marginal identities and understand how my body/mind/desire/behavior shape(d) my past, present, and future experiences. I became a loud, at times angry, young activist who consistently called out others on their white, straight, upper-class, and/or male privilege. When it came to the oppression Olympics, I was a gold-medal contender, the ultimate minority, and I made it my business to teach those privileged subjects around me how to be allies to feminist, antiracist, and LBGTQIA 5 movements. I thought I knew it all.

Then, during my sophomore year, I took an elective course for my Women's Studies major entitled "Women and Disability" with Drs. Kathy McMahon-Klosterman and Jean Lynch.6 In that course, I encountered my own unrecognized privilege for the first time. While I was aware of my class and nationality privileges, they didn't bother me because I easily recognized them and tried to act as an ally as a result. The experience of learning about (dis)ability as a social system of oppression and privilege, however, one I had never even remotely considered, shifted my entire worldview. I had previously scoffed at the notion of white guilt, 8 but my initial reaction to the revelation of my ability privilege was also one of guilt. Though it took some time to come out of that emotionally reactive state, I did eventually begin to pay critical attention to the ability privileges I receive each day and before the end of the semester I had declared myself a vocal ally of disability rights communities. I did this not only because I immediately made connections between (dis)ability and other systems of privilege and oppression, but also because I realized that if I ever again wanted to call someone out on their other forms of privilege or encourage them to be an ally to me, I absolutely had to evaluate my own ability privilege and become an ally myself.

The "Women and Disability" class led to other classes on disability and eventually to a disability studies minor, a senior thesis on student activism, and membership in the Society for Disability Studies (SDS). The summer after I graduated I attended the SDS annual conference with Dr. Kathy McMahon-Klosterman to help lead a roundtable discussion about student activism. It was this conference experience that solidified my relationship to disability studies.

Initially, I was simply thrilled to be in the presence of such academic and activist greatness. I met Rosemarie Garland-Thomson at lunch. I attended a workshop with Eli Clare. I sat behind Jim Ferris at a panel. I had never experienced such an interesting, exciting, and friendly intellectual environment. Something felt right about this space. On the last night of the conference I prepared myself for the (in)famous SDS dance. I had read about the spirit of SDS and the unrivaled nature of its culminating dance in Simi Linton's (2006) memoir, My Body Politic, so I was more excitedly nervous for this event than I was for my prom. Would the dance live up to everything Linton made it out to be?

As I entered the basement hallway of the CUNY building where the dance would occur, I could hear the music thumping with the strong trembling bass used so people who are Deaf, hard of hearing, or hearing impaired can feel the rhythm pulse. I entered the dark space to see a cornucopia of bodies scattered around the room: people spinning, rolling, jumping, shaking, wriggling, fist-pumping, sashaying, and bouncing in an explosion of movements, large and small. I saw people in chairs (wheeled and not) sitting on the sidelines clapping their hands or tapping their feet as they talked, drank, and laughed, their bodies close, sometimes interlaced. There was ethos of community and love in that room and though I was terrified of knowing no one and not fitting in, I also desperately wanted to dance.

Though still unsure of myself, when I located the unmistakable hair of Simi's husband, David, across the dance floor, I headed over to join their group of dancers. That night, my body moved more freely and less self-consciously than it ever had before because, at this dance, people were not watching me the way they sometimes stare or leer at dance clubs or bars; folks were looking, but here with friendly excitement or admiration. One of my dance partners that night, the beautiful and talented Alice Sheppard of AXIS Dance Company, followed the lead of my movements, adapting and responding to them with her own agile body and wheelchair. Then she helped me learn to watch her as well, to follow her movements, spinning, sliding, touching hands, and shaking our hair. I didn't leave until the wine was gone, the music stopped, and people started to disperse. I replayed the dance in my head as I headed back to my hotel and though I did not yet have the language for it, my first Society for Disability Studies dance was the moment I began to both disidentify with/in disability studies and identify with crip.

I am primarily using disidentification as elucidated by José Esteban Muñoz (1999) in Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics. He defines disidentification as a strategic survival strategy of identification for/of/by those with multiple intersecting marginal identities whom Muñoz refers to as minoritarian subjects. Muñoz's theorization of disidentification relies upon Michel Pecheux's reworking of Louis Althusser's theory of interpellation in which disidentification is defined as a third identification stance in relation to dominant ideology that refuses to either fully conform or fully resist. Muñoz uses disidentification similarly to understand how queers of color relate and/or respond to dominant representations, particularly through performance.

For example, Muñoz opens the book with a description of Marga Gomez's performance piece, Marga Gomez Is Pretty, Witty, and Gay, in which Gomez sees lesbians on television for the first time and is captivated by their mysterious allure because the women are all depicted wearing raincoats, wigs, and sunglasses to hide their identities. Muñoz uses this as an example of a minoritarian subject negotiating and reinterpreting a mainstream image intended as negative. He insists that the act of disidentification is neither assimilationist nor anti-assimilationist, but rather, it's an alternative political resistance strategy that works with and against dominant ideology at the same time for the performative and political purposes of minoritarian subjects.

In Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique, Roderick A. Ferguson (2004) makes similar claims about the possibilities of disidentification regarding queer of color critique's disidentification with historical materialism. Ferguson writes that to disidentify means to take up with revisions, to determine "the silences and ideologies that reside within critical terrains" (p. 5) and refuse to take up or extend legacies of racism, sexism, or homophobia in theory and research. 10 Disidentification is therefore a way to locate one's self within, take up and (re)use representations and theories in ways that were not originally intended. Disidentification is not, however, the only useful minoritarian political strategy and may not be appropriate or effective for all subjects or situations (Muñoz, 1999).

Despite the fact that both Ferguson and Muñoz focus on queers of color (minoritarian subjects) disidentifying with dominant (majoritarian) representations and theories, both indirectly suggest that disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects in relation to other minoritarian representations. For example, Muñoz suggests that a queer woman might disidentify with the work of Frantz Fanon (2004), being critical of its sexist and homophobic moments while still finding and revising useful aspects of the text. Fanon, a black psychiatrist and postcolonial philosopher, is not a majoritarian subject, however, he is privileged on multiple fronts and his discussions of women and homosexuals in Black Skins, White Masks, for example, adheres to majoritarian ideology in regard to these other minoritarian subjects. As documented by intersectionality scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), Lisa Duggan (2002), and Jasbir Puar (2007), different subjects can simultaneously resist certain hegemonic ideologies while being complicit in others.

Taking up this adapted understanding of disidentification, I find myself, a minoritarian subject, disidentifying with disability studies, a minoritarian field of research, because although the field's resistance to the pathologization of non-normative bodies appeals to me as a nondisabled, fat, black, queer woman, the shortage of substantive race analysis within the field and the relatively minor attention given to issues of class and sexuality trouble me deeply and disallow me any direct Good Subject identification. The whiteness of disability studies has already been noted by Chris Bell (2006) in his essay "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal." However, the ubiquitous citation of this essay as the reference for disability studies scholars attempting to acknowledge race in relation to disability simply underscores the need for more critical scholarship on race in the field at this time. 12 While this lack of a substantial amount of research on race and disability does not necessarily mean there are also no people of color within the field (because people of color do not necessarily do research on race), the racial diversity of the disability studies researcher population that I've witnessed is minimal. The continued conspicuous presence of my racialized body at disability studies conferences and events disconcerts me and makes me wary of being tokenized. These emotions further facilitate my disidentification with/in disability studies. Following Ferguson and Muñoz, because this collection of theories and practices do not seem originally intended for me, as a researcher I must take up and revise disability theories and scholarship while refusing to extend its legacy of whiteness and racism.

Despite the disjuncture I experience in the field as it currently exists, I still have a deeply personal, emotional affinity with disability studies scholar and activist communities. This affinity is what facilitates my coming to claim and identify with crip. Note here, that there are a few key differences between disidentification and identifying with as I am using them. Disidentification is primarily in respect to representations, ideologies, and theories which have important, useful aspects that the disidentifying subject takes up, uses, or revamps while leaving behind or being critical of other problematic or damaging elements. To identify with, as I will explain more below, is to personally and politically align oneself with a group one may or may not belong to, but with which one feels a positive connection. I discuss these concepts separately in order to distinguish my relationship to the field of disability studies from my relationship to the concept of crip, not to claim one form of identification is more positive or useful than the other. In fact, disidentification and identifying with have important areas of overlap and intersection.

Crip is a term many people within disability studies and activist communities use not only in reference to people with disabilities, but also to the intellectual and art culture arising from such communities. Crip is shorthand for the word "cripple" which has been (and is) used as an insult toward people with disabilities, but which has been re-appropriated as an intra-group term of empowerment and solidarity. Thus, crip "is a term which has much currency in disability activism and culture but still might seem harsh to those outside those communities" (Kafer, 2013, p. 15). An early proponent of crip's social and political potential, Carrie Sandahl (2003) describes crip as a "fluid and ever-changing" term which "expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory or mental impairments as well" (p. 27). In a footnote to her use of the term, Sandahl recognizes the still-developing state of disability studies and writes: "If I had my druthers, I would replace the term disability studies with crip theory or crip studies to represent its radical edge" (p. 53; original emphasis).

Robert McRuer (2006), however, proposes that crip theory is not a one-to-one replacement for disability studies, but rather, crip theory has "a similar contestatory relationship to disability studies and identity that queer theory has to LGBT studies and identity, [although] crip theory does not—perhaps paradoxically—seek to dematerialize disability identity" (p. 35). This move away from the postmodern dematerialization of identity positions is a key connection between crip theory and queer of color critique by scholars such as Cathy Cohen (2005), Lawrence La Fountain-Stokes (2009), and others who have actively resisted such moves, insisting that to move entirely away from identity and identity politics is not a viable option for those who are multiply marginalized and who need such identity positions for survival and collective action. As Roderick Ferguson (2004) writes, queer of color critique rethinks categories, but does not discard them. Related to Ferguson's rethinking of categories, Alison Kafer (2013) argues that crip theory expands and enriches disability studies by departing from the social model's assumption that "disabled" and "nondisabled" are discrete, self-evident categories, choosing instead to explore the creation of such categories and the moments in which they "fail to hold" (p. 10).

Sandahl, McRuer and Kafer all emphasize the relationship of crip and queer. Sandahl (2003) insists that like queer, crip is not only a noun and adjective, but also a verb: to "crip" means to spin "mainstream representations or practices to reveal able-bodied assumptions and exclusionary effects […to] expose the arbitrary delineation between normal and defective and the negative social ramifications of attempts to homogenize humanity" (p. 37). Crip as verb can therefore be understood as a specific form of disidentification. Making further connections between crip and queer, Sandahl writes:

As a pejorative, the term queer was originally targeted at gays and lesbians, yet its rearticulation as a term of pride is currently claimed by those who may not consider themselves homosexual, such as the transgendered, transsexuals, heterosexual sex radicals, and others. […Although] I have never heard a nondisabled person seriously claim to be crip (as heterosexuals have claimed to be queer), I would not be surprised by this practice. The fluidity of both terms makes it likely that their boundaries will dissolve (p. 27).

This specific aspect of the relationship between queer and crip, the possibility of these terms referring to or being claimed by people not previously referenced by them, is critical to the current direction of crip theory and to my own identification with the term. Kafer (2013) writes that crip, or crip affiliation, could include both "those who lack a 'proper' (read: medically acceptable, doctor-provided, and insurer-approved) diagnosis for their symptoms" and, more complexly, "people identifying with disability and lacking not only a diagnosis but any 'symptoms' of impairment" (p. 12-13). In a related vein, McRuer (2006) writes that although one must be "attuned to the dangers of appropriation," it is both theoretically and politically "important to raise issues about what it means, for the purposes of solidarity, to come out as something you are—at least in some ways—not" (p. 37).

I align myself with McRuer's "coming out crip" and Kafer's "crip affiliation" by claiming crip and declaring myself a crip-identified, fat, black, queer woman. Kafer writes:

Claiming crip can be a way of acknowledging that we all have bodies and minds with shifting abilities, and that such shifts have political and social meanings and histories. It can be a way of imagining multiple futures, claiming crip as a desired and desirable location, regardless of one's own embodiment or mental/psychological processes… thinking through what nondisabled claims to crip might entail will require exploring whether such claims might be more available, more imaginable, to some people than others (and on what basis) (pp. 13).

I argue that my particular relationship to racial, gender, and sexuality systems of oppression and privilege is what makes claiming crip available to me. The ways in which my fat, black, queer, woman's body/mind/desire/behavior is constantly read and reacted to as non-normative, sometimes excessively so, makes me feel particularly akin to those who identify as disabled and/or crip, people whose bodies/minds/desires/behaviors are also outside the social norm. In this way, I argue that I am similarly situated in regard to many vectors of power as people with disabilities and that interrogation into the processes which have so situated us are needed in order to develop coalitional theory and politial solidarity.

It is important to emphasize that I am calling myself crip-identified, meaning that I identify with not as crip, a distinction McRuer (2006) suggests in his work, but does not make sufficiently clear. I use identify with to mean having acknowledged and prioritized political and personal connections to a group with which one does not identify as a member. To identify with means to feel implicated by the culture and politics of another group and seek to better understand this link. While to identify with could be understood as analogous to being an ally, I contend that there is something more personal, sustained, and affective about it. Identifying with is a careful, conscious joining—a standing/sitting among rather than by or behind a group—which seeks to reduce separation while acknowledging differences in privileges and oppression. I connect identifying with to Cathy Cohen's (2005) call for a radical politics of shared resistance built on identities as they are impacted by and invested with different degrees of normative power. Identifying with is particularly important in the case of disability which, as many have noted, is the only identity category which one can join at any moment without intent. I use crip-identified as something different than disability ally because it is an almost-not-quite-yet identification. I am crip-identified not only because my body/mind/desire/behavior is non-normative in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and size, but also because of its precarious relationship to disability as this term is currently culturally understood.

I want to be clear that I am aware of my ability privileges and I know, as McRuer (2006) insists, that I cannot make such privileges "magically disappear" by simply refusing them because "the benefits that accrue to nondisabled people in that [ability/disability] system are bigger than any individual's seemingly voluntary refusal of them" (p. 36). With this recognition of privilege in mind, I contend that fatness represents an important form of embodiment which needs further engagement within the field of disability studies. Fatness is one of the primary avenues through which I identify with crip and therefore I want to discuss a few of the connections between fatness and disability here to further illustrate how I have come to claim crip.

## AFF

### 2AC --- Liberalism

**Even if political liberalism currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it**

**Badano 13** (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, **should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities?** An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial **revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with** our intuitions concerning **what is due to the disabled.** 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: **why should we uphold** the project of **political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model** that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled**?** First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, **political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities.** This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

### 2AC --- Reform

**Abstract critique keeps us from forefronting political reform**

**Ruckelshaus 17** (Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, "The Non-Politics of Disability”, 1/18/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, **rather than politically structured injustices**. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. **We must politicize disability** — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? **How do we even define “disability”?** Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.

##### **Disability must be politicized---this is the only way to secure collective rights---the retreat from politics reifies ableist tropes of charity politics and naively tries to wish problems away**

Ruckelshaus 17, (Jay Ruckelshaus is a Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, The Non-Politics of Disability, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics.

### 2AC --- Perm

**Perm solves – challenging ableist assumptions must be coupled with evaluative judgement**

**Vehmas & Watson 13** (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 642-643)

\*CDS = Critical Disability Studies

CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the pragmatic and mundane issues of day-today living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the fetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, **considerations having to do with pain and suffering are nevertheless morally significant.** The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but freeing oneself from ableist assumptions **may not in some cases be enough.** There may be insurmountable realities attached to some impairments where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003). Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, but in general we can and we need to agree about some necessary elements required for well-being. Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong. CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of shirking from intellectual and ethical responsibility to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, **it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues** inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault): while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, I would argue that critique is indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and why. (Sayer 2011, 244)

### 2AC --- State Good

#### State action can be good for people with disabilities – ADA proves

Mckeever 20 (Amy Mckeever, JULY 30, 2020, "How the Americans with Disabilities Act transformed a country," History, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/americans-disabilities-act-transformed-united-states> ) //RB

More than 2,000 disability rights advocates gathered on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on a hot summer day. It was July 26, 1990, and they’d come together to witness one of the most momentous civil rights victories in decades: President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.

During the signing ceremony—days after the Fourth of July—Bush admitted that the United States hadn’t always lived up to its founding principles of freedom and equality. “[T]ragically, for too many Americans, the blessings of liberty have been limited or even denied,” he said. “Today’s legislation brings us closer to that day when no Americans will ever again be deprived of their basic guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

The ADA not only provided comprehensive civil rights protections for people with disabilities for the first time in the nation’s history, but it also marked a sea change in the nation’s attitudes toward disability rights. Here’s how the landmark statute came to be, and how it transformed the country.

The disability rights movement gains steam

Throughout history, people with disabilities were feared and ridiculed for their perceived defects and pushed to the margins of society. By the 1960s, that discrimination had been codified. People with disabilities were excluded from public schools, involuntarily sterilized, sent to live in state-run institutions, and even denied the right to vote. Some U.S. municipalities even had so-called “ugly laws” prohibiting people with “unsightly or disgusting” deformities in public places. It was a world designed not to include people with disabilities. Government buildings and private businesses alike lacked ramps and elevators, while public transportation rarely provided accommodations for people with mobility or visual impairments. Having a disability was considered a medical problem to be solved rather than an identity to be protected under non-discrimination laws. But things began to change in the 1970s. Inspired by the civil rights movement of the 1960s, disability rights advocates became more vocal in their demands that their rights ought to be guaranteed as well. Disability had also become more noticeable as wars in Vietnam and Korea returned thousands of soldiers with lasting injuries. In 1973, advocates won the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibited programs receiving federal funding from discriminating against people with disabilities. It was the first piece of legislation to use the term “discrimination” to describe the limitations that these Americans face.

For the law to go into effect, the government would have to issue regulations defining who qualifies as a person with a disability and what constitutes discrimination in the disability context. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare put off issuing those regulations for four years as they wrestled over the terms. Impatient with the delay—and worried it meant the regulations would be weakened—advocates organized protests around the country. In April 1977 they launched a sit-in at a federal building in San Francisco that would last for 28 days—the longest peaceful occupation of a federal building in U.S. history—and result in victory.

The need for a comprehensive civil rights law

With Section 504, the American public began to understand that making accommodations for people with disabilities was a civil right rather than a welfare benefit. It also galvanized a growing disability rights movement that won several other important victories in the 1970s and 1980s—including legislation that guaranteed a free public education to children with impairments and prohibited housing discrimination on the basis of disabilities. Yet discrimination persisted. In 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that the nursing school at Southeastern Community College in Whiteville, North Carolina, was not required by Section 504 to accommodate a hearing-impaired applicant. In other circumstances, regulations were simply not well enforced. For example, transit authorities were left to decide for themselves how accessible they needed to be. (A skull discovered in Spain suggests that early humans cared for disabled children.) In the mid-1980s, advocates came to the conclusion that the critical next step was to push for comprehensive civil rights legislation for people with disabilities. The National Council on Disability commissioned a report on the need for such a law, while its vice chair Justin Dart—who would later become known as the “Godfather of the ADA”—embarked on a national tour to discuss disability policy with local officials and gather stories of the discrimination people with disabilities faced. These advocacy efforts made an impression on both sides of the political aisle. Disability rights had become a bipartisan issue thanks to years of changing public perceptions. In 1988, Senators Lowell Weicker, a Republican from Connecticut, and Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa, introduced the Americans with Disabilities Act. After years of revisions, amendments, and negotiations, the bill was passed, and on that July day Bush—who had made civil rights legislation for people with disabilities a campaign promise in 1988—signed it into law with Dart by his side.

Why the ADA matters

The Americans with Disabilities Act was a sweeping piece of legislation that banned discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecommunication. It finally afforded people with disabilities the same protections that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had provided on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.

"It is the world’s first declaration of equality for people with disabilities," Dart wrote after the ADA was passed. "It will proclaim to America and to the world that people with disabilities are fully human; that paternalistic, discriminatory, segregationist attitudes are no longer acceptable; and that henceforth people with disabilities must be accorded the same personal respect and the same social and economic opportunities as other people."

The ADA launched the process of building a more accessible world by ensuring that buildings, schools, and public spaces were equipped with ramps, elevators, and curb cuts. It made travel easier by requiring operators to make accommodations, such as offering wheelchair lifts, airport shuttle service, and rental cars with hand controls. It also led to the rise of interpreters and closed captioning in public communications. (These five coastal areas have made accessibility a priority.)

After a tragic accident ended her dance career, Kitty Lunn taught herself how to dance again in her wheelchair. Today, Lunn empowers her students to "dance in the body you have" in this film by Qingzi Fan. The Short Film Showcase spotlights exceptional short videos create...Read More

Crucially, this legislation has also become a model for lawmakers and activists around the world seeking to end discrimination against people with disabilities in their countries. Since 2000, more than 180 countries have passed legislation inspired by the ADA. The law is limited, however. The ADA has been criticized for failing to increase employment among people with disabilities—only 19 percent are in the workforce today compared with 66 percent of those without disabilities. People with disabilities are still disenfranchised. Accommodations at polling places across the nation are inadequate; in 2016, a government report found that 60 percent of the polling places it examined had one or more potential impediments, such as ramps that were dangerously steep or paths in poor condition. Meanwhile, 39 states and Washington, D.C., have incompetence laws that allow judges to strip the vote from people they deem incapable of participating in the democratic process, such as people with mental impairments. Stigma and discrimination persist throughout society too. The ADA may not be perfect, but as Dart wrote in 1990, it “is only the beginning. It is not a solution. Rather, it is an essential foundation on which solutions will be constructed.”

### 2AC --- War Turns alt

#### War turns—distinctly bad for people with disabilities

Maria Berghs and Nawaf Kabbara 16 (November 8, 2016, “Chapter 17 Disabled People in Conflicts and Wars” , Disability in the Global South by Disability in the Global South The Critical Handbook, Editors: Shaun Grech, Karen Soldatic , https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-42488-0 )// RB

The long-term consequences of protracted confl ict on disabled people and the creation of impairment need more research. This calls for a longitudinal or life-course approach (Priestley 2007 ) to see how identities, single and multiple impairment(s), health and social care needs differ as the age of populations and their environments change. A life-course approach can also explore how the concept of disability is changing intergenerationally, whether passed on biologically (e.g. HIV/AIDS) and socially (e.g. stigma), or through ascription of a new kinship identity (e.g. amputee) (Berghs 2012 ). Yet, research, funding and planning to understand the long-term effects of confl ict on disability is rarely available (Wehbi 2011a ). Inhorn and Kobeissi ( 2006 ) usefully note how there are six long-term effects of confl ict on civilians: physical, mental, reproductive/demographic, social structural, infrastructural, and environmental. We briefl y discuss each of these in turn in an effort to illustrate what is missing from current debates in relation to disability.

Physical We know very little about civilian deaths and creation of impairment despite the fact that poorly resourced health systems contribute to death, illness and impairment (Banatvala and Zwi 2000 ; WHO 2011 ). With the focus on public health, the effects of malnutrition, communicable and non-communicable diseases, unsanitary conditions and lack of access to water are given substantial attention post-confl ict. For example, Miles and Medi ( 1994 ) found that while confl ict in Mozambique had resulted in impairment among children, most actually gained indirect impairments due to a mix of effects created by the long-term consequences of the confl ict, such as malnutrition. Insurance provision, necessary implementation of user fees for services and a lack of (paid) professionals, medication, assistive devices, prosthetics and rehabilitation programmes affect impairment, too. Growing privatisation under neo-liberalism is also a threat to access to health and social care services (Berghs 2013 ). Likewise, the impact of landmines, chemicals and circulation of (small) arms can last for generations and will need long-term planning of services. Long-term effects of confl ict and links to impairment need to be identifi ed so that services can be planned and implemented adequately .

Mental In post-confl ict situations, there are increases in mental health needs such as for counselling, social care and specialised psychiatric services. Inhorn and Kobeissi ( 2006 ) cite lack of infrastructural development and trained professionals, as well as not prioritising mental health as detrimental to well-being. The evidence base for many interventions affecting disabled people does not exist, especially in the fi eld of gender-based violence and mental health (Blanchet et al. 2013 ). Likewise, while there is a lot of data on western veterans, there is very little information on culturally sensitive, indigenous or communal interventions for disabled people. Institutionalisation, stigma, western diagnoses (following the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5) and links to pharmaceutical companies also infl uence how mental health care is accessed and why. Thus, coping strategies involving cheap and freely available pharmaceuticals, alcohol and/or drugs develop in society (Inhorn and Kobeissi 2006 ). More research is needed to explore the longterm mental health impact of conflict.

Reproductive/Demographic Lives are disrupted during a confl ict, as families, gender relations and patterns of reproduction undergo profound changes. Marriage is a means of societal integration for disabled people but when most men are fi ghting or community ties are disrupted, there may be earlier, delayed or no marriages taking place. Periods of confl ict also have reproductive consequences for disabled women and men with lack of access to reproductive services, antenatal, postnatal and emergency care. There may also be an increase in perceived need for certain services or technologies to prevent impairment, such as antenatal screening in Vietnam (Gammeltoft 2013 ). Correlations exist between lack of access to reproductive services (e.g. screening and contraception) and war-time sexual violence, increases in Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) , infertility, infant deaths and children born with impairments. Disabled people often face discrimination in services and institutions ensuring neglect, segregation, sterilisation or institutionalisation. For example, Human Rights Watch ( 2010 ) documented high rates of physical and sexual abuse of disabled women post-confl ict, but a lack of access to reproductive services, health education and STI testing continues. Lack of access to reproductive services pre- and post-confl ict is important to understand demographically.

Social Structural The social structure of society changes during a confl ict and the informal CBR systems that families and communities are supplied with may collapse. Programmes implemented by NGOs that superfi cially mainstream disability may also increase poverty and marginalisation of disabled people (see Wehbi 2011a ). There could be rising violence on account of (small) arms and the circulation of drugs, often with links to criminal networks and gangs, which leads to rises in specifi c types of impairment (e.g. spinal cord injuries caused by bullet wounds) (Buchanan 2011 ; Handicap International [HI] 2012 ). Confl ict and post-confl ict societal upheaval may last for decades with the threat of bombs, drones and violence profoundly affecting communities. Hill and Hansen ( 2011 ) describe how in Northern Ireland, a state of terror with bombs going off meant that those with mobility problems were forced to stay at home, leading to greater social isolation. Social isolation has also been identifi ed as a risk factor when it comes to exploitation of disabled people (Grove et al. 2010 ). The consequences of societal breakdown, lack of evaluation of disability programming during a confl ict and post-confl ict, and the programmes that empower disabled people to survive must be urgently addressed.

Infrastructural Confl ict destroys most of the limited infrastructure that exists for disabled people. Vocational workshops, institutions such as day centres, and schools need to be rebuilt. Post-confl ict rebuilding can offer an opportunity for inclusive design and mainstreaming of disability in all infrastructural development. For instance, while education is disrupted, new opportunities present themselves to rebuild educational and vocational systems through inclusive practices (Miles 2013 ). Such interventions will have little impact, however, if issues in the current educational system, notably that teachers lack training and know-how and are often unpaid, are neglected. Likewise, ensuring suitable skills training, micro-credit programmes, and employment in the formal and informal economy are particular concerns post-confl ict, but there will be gross diffi - culties in improving disabled people’s situation if societal attitudes remain negative, barriers persist in transportation systems, or there is no economy to contribute to. Therefore, we need to understand more about what enables the entire social and physical infrastructure to become inclusive and robust post-confl ict.

Environmental The exploitation of resources and environmental impact of confl icts will be felt for generations. Yet, the impact of new forms of impairment on indigenous communities and women is rarely investigated (Ngo et al. 2012 ). Likewise, disability rights and intergenerational rights in terms of creation of differing forms of impairment are rarely advocated (Soldatic 2013 ). North–South hierarchies in bodies and body parts are thus still correlated with inequalities, especially in countries with histories of violence or confl ict that are undergoing political transitions (see Scheper-Hughes 1996 ). This is exemplifi ed in biopolitical claims for genetic reproductive harm, such as the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, nuclear testing in the southern hemisphere and the use of depleted uranium in Iraq, which are rarely upheld. Refl ections on newer forms of biosociality, or social identities based on biological, genetic or medical conditions (such as HIV/AIDs), chemical and environmental harm, and the links between confl ict, violence and activism remain unexplored.

### 2AC --- Alt fails activism

**Alt fails – doesn’t account for neoliberal exploitation and categorization is key to activism**

**Vehmas & Watson 13** (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 646-648)

Critical disability studies and justice

The influence of CDS and its challenge to the assumption that disability is a uniform condition have enabled the emergence of new ideas on disability. In particular, this has enabled the development of a theory that can take account of not only impairment effects but also can include class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or cultural identities. It has also argued for the re-emergence of a new political identity, one where a solidarity that was previously built on a common single identity is replaced by one that incorporates multiple voices including representatives from across the range of constituencies. The politics that it seeks to develop will be the ending of the single interest group identity of the disability movement to be replaced by single-issue groups campaigning for different social issues. To paraphrase Lister (1998, 74), if disability and impairment are simply to be ‘deconstructed into a kaleidoscope of shifting identities’ and ableist discourses, **there will be no disabled people left to either fight for the right to be, or to be a citizen.** If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; **they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement** (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require **more than ideological change**, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change. CDS **fails to account for the economic basis of disability** and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). Markets are not controlled by nor are they subsidiary to culture; ‘as a result they generate economic inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’ (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the social and physical mechanisms that produce human diversity are real, and they produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged, let alone abolished, merely by pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and deconstructing the meanings attached to disability. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can **enable the development of communities of resistance**, and without it is hard to see how these could develop. CDS is premised on the idea that difference acts as a precursor to the normalizing of behaviour and a requirement to treat people differently and, importantly, less favourably. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the categories that are applied to disabled people create an unnecessary divide between disabled and nondisabled people. You could equally make the point that without these categories we would not know what it is we have to do, what actions we have to take or what services we have to put in place to include disabled people. Indeed, for many disabled people the disadvantages they are subjected to arise not as the result of domination but through neglect and the denial of services and through society failing to take responsibility for those in need. As Wolff (2009, 114) points out: ‘anti-discrimination policy needs to identify a group to be protected.’ In other words, it is impossible to fight the oppression of a group of people that does not exist. Recognition of impairment is also crucial regarding legislation and policy that aim to protect disabled people against discrimination. The point of anti-discrimination legislation is to protect people from discrimination on the basis of their physical and mental properties, not on their opportunity to achieve equal participation and respect. Thus, ‘the parallel to race and gender is not disability but impairment’ (Wolff 2009, 135).

### 2AC --- Alt Fails Mindset

**Alt can’t change society’s worldview and only marginalizes material experiences**

**Vehmas & Watson 13** (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 648-649)

Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. **Disability is not the same** as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because **these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment.** In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension **does not imply devaluing people with impairments** nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical.

## Random

### 2NC --- FW

#### Centering the question of antiblackness in educational spaces is necessary to disrupt the antiblack logics of the nation state that pathologize black youth as lacking intellectualism

Justin A. **Coles 2021** “It’s really geniuses that live in the hood”: Black urban youth curricular un/makings and centering Blackness in slavery’s afterlife, Curriculum Inquiry, DOI: 10.1080/03626784.2020.1856622]//sheima

In regards to antiblackness, learning was rooted in the specific idea that Black people lacked intellectualism (Anderson, 1988; Ladson-Billings, 2006; Ruelas, 2017; Williams, 2009). However, many scholars have documented the ways Black people were more than capable of, and possessed a fierce desire for, learning (Anderson, 1988; Cornelius, 1991; Gundaker, 2007; Payne & Strickland, 2008; Span, 2009; Williams, 2009). The deficit theory of Black anti-intellectualism was used because whites owning enslaved persons understood that Black learning would subvert slavery’s structure. In particular, whites held the belief that “learning will spoil the ~~nigger~~ for work” (Anderson, 1988, p. 6 J. A. COLES 20). While some enslaved Blacks were granted access to literacy to aid in basic tasks to help run the property, such as helping with accounts and supplies, this was not the reality for most (Gundaker, 2007). ¶ Socially constructed and stereotypical imaginings of Black people as “less able to think abstractly,” were used by whites to argue that Blacks were naturally fit for slavery (Plous & Williams, 1995, p. 796). As Ruelas (2017) explained, “slave masters were intent on keeping their slaves illiterate.” Due to the ways antiblackness positioned Black people as less than, the majority of those enslaved were excluded from all educational experience. Indeed, the enslaved “were not allowed books, pen, ink, nor paper, to improve their minds” (Williams, 2009, p. 9). The mind of the slave was deemed a non-factor, which facilitated the ways they were reduced solely to their ability to labor (Spivey, 1978) and to fuel and sustain capitalism (Smith, 2012).¶ After emancipation, many white northern missionaries, full of zeal, went to the US South to educate Blacks (Anderson, 1988; Bush, 2004; Jones, 1992; Williams, 2009). However, this enthusiasm diminished as they “began to realize that they had failed to understand the full effects of generations of slavery” (Newby & Tyack, 1971, p. 195). Bullock (1967, p. 93) revealed that educators “decided to sell the idea of Negro education to white Southerners by sacrificing the principle of racial equality …the best way to assure the sale was to emphasize its value to the purchaser” (as cited in Newby & Tyack, 1971, p. 196). History reveals that the living and learning experiences of Black youth are rooted in the full effects of chattel slavery and sustained through sacrificing racial equality; making curriculum for Black children one of the US’ earliest projects in interest convergence or when “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites” (Bell, 1980, p. 523).¶ Centering Blackness as Critique of Antiblackness Today, Black youth are still not fully benefitting from educational experiences (Baszile, 2019; Caldera, 2020; Coles & Powell, 2020; Lozenski, 2017; Ohito, 2016), because antiblackness continues to manifest in present-day curriculum (Brown & Brown, 2020). This becomes clear when we understand that “the telos of educational praxis for most schools can only come into being through the logics of the imperialist, (settler) colonialist state” (Snaza, 2019, p. 13). In our nation, where the legacy of slavery and antiBlack racism is the paradigmatic signifier of white settler supremacy (Day, 2015), curriculum can be understood as anti-Black by design. ¶ Regardless of a student’s Black ethnicity, how they dress, or their buy-in to myths of Black exceptionalism, Black youth have “no permanent shield against the injuries of racism,” or “the enduring impact of anti-Blackness in everyday life” (Wallace, 2018, p. 278). Distinctly, the schooling of Black people in the US has served as a site of racial animus and miseducation throughout history and continues to serve as a site of Black suffering (Dumas, 2014). While antiblackness robs Black youth of affirming curricular spaces, schools are also robbed of the dynamic knowledges of Black children, Black genius. Ladson-Billings’ (1995) concept of culturally relevant pedagogy and subsequent asset based concepts like culturally sustaining pedagogy (Paris & Alim, 2014) are in fact fueled by the idea that the lives of Black and other minoritized youth can inform the ways schools become better, more humanizing social institutions.¶ Here, I am reminded of Gaztambide-Fernandez and Murad’s (2011) curriculum imperative of browning curriculum and pedagogy or examining “race, nation, and their intersections with multiple forms of oppression within curriculum studies” (p. 15). Through browning, we can “force the hidden hand of the racism that lurks at every turn of the curriculum studies discourse” (Tuck & Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2013, pp. 83–84), revealing “the ways in which colonial heteropatriarchal White supremacy continues to pervade curriculum studies” (Gaztambide-Fernandez & Murad, 2011, p. 15). Brown and Au (2014) extended curricular browning, charging the field to “give specific and detailed theoretical attention to issues of ‘race’ and curriculum that address the material, historical, and discursive processes of ‘race’ and racism” (p. 381). However, for this to manifest, educators need to critically evaluate what Dyson (2015) labeled as ideologically charged institutional discourse, which categorizes Black students as inherently less than, resulting in ongoing Black curricular exclusion. ¶ If we consider the ways US curriculum sustains antiblackness by resting in ahistorical narratives that marginalize “the myriad ways that Black people lived in and shaped U.S. life” (Brown & Brown, 2020, p. 76), it can be deduced that Black people suffer at the hands of curriculum by having their Blackness devalued. Centering Blackness in curriculum is necessary to facilitate the disruption of learning designed through the anti-Black logics of the nation-state. The need for a centering of Blackness in curriculum that leverages critiques of antiblackness, becomes evident when we understand that “thus far there has been little theorizing in education on the specificity of antiBlack racism” or what Dumas (2016b) contends “is the broader terrain of anti- blackness” (p. 12). While antiblackness will always find a home within curriculum, I contend that through a direct centering of Blackness, curriculum workers can be more attentive in efforts to co-construct curricular spaces that position Black youth life-worlds as essential. ¶